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SUMMARY    
Increasingly these days, property rights are no longer seen as absolute but as 
being more relative. The view has been expressed that “at one time …property owners 
exercised virtually unfettered control over property. As social standards changed, the 
law changed to recognize the primacy of certain public interests over the rights 
of…property owners”1. Accordingly, in many common law jurisdictions it is becoming 
widely accepted that the landowner’s powers of eviction should be circumscribed by 
an overarching principle of reasonableness. There are court decisions and in some 
jurisdictions2 there are statutes that limit the owner’s right to exclude all others from 
his land. 
This thesis discusses in detail the nature of and the reasons supporting the right 
of public access, the circumstances in which the principle should apply and also the 
rights and obligations of both owner and members of the public. 
It is the purpose of this paper to consider what is the Singapore position on the 
emerging principle of reasonable public access to land open for public use. For this 
purpose land open for public use is divided into three categories, namely State land, 
land belonging to statutory corporations and land belonging to private individuals. The 
Singapore legislation dealing with public access to these different types of land is then 
analyzed in order to show whether the principle is recognized and applied in each of 
the categories, regardless of the nature of ownership rights.  
                                                
1See Green Party of New Jersey v. Hartz Mountain Industries Inc [2000] 752 A2d 315 at 322, per 
O’Hern J. 
2
 In United Kingdom, for example, in the Countryside and Right of Way Act 2000 it is established the 
public’s recreational right to access wild tract of open private land. 
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It should be mentioned that in Singapore, to the best of my knowledge, there is 
no case dealing with this matter. On the other hand, in other jurisdictions, such as 
Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States, the principle of reasonable 
access is dealt with predominantly in court decisions. For this reason, I discuss the 
relevant case law from these four jurisdictions in order to give a comparative basis for 
the position taken in Singapore. Since not all these jurisdictions have cases dealing 
with public access to all types of land open for public use, depending on the type and 
intended user of the land, I discuss relevant court decisions from one or more of these 
jurisdictions. 
This thesis aims to show that the principle of reasonable public access should 
apply whenever land is open for public use, regardless whether is held in State or 
private ownership. It also advocates for an explicit statutory recognition of this 
principle. It is submitted that a right clearly established by statute would offer a better 
protections for all members of the public and it would give no scope for judicial 
application of the traditional conservative view that allows the landowner to arbitrarily 
exclude any person from his land. 
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION   
In Singapore all land belongs to the State. The State may grant parcels of land 
to individuals or corporations. The grantees do not really own the physical land itself 
but periods of time over the land during which they can exercise their rights of 
ownership. These time periods are called “estates”. In Singapore now there are four 
kinds of estate in land, namely the freehold fee simple estate, the freehold life estate, 
the estate in perpetuity created by the State Lands Act1, and the leasehold estate. 
Ownership of land in Singapore refers to ownership of one of these types of estates2. 
Even though all land belongs to the State, it does not mean that there is no 
private property in Singapore. The individuals or the institutions that are granted 
estates of land by the State are true “owners” and are entitled to certain rights over the 
land. The commonly accepted rights associated with the ownership of an estate in land 
are the rights to possess and to exclude all others from accessing the land, the right to 
use and enjoy it in the manner the owner likes subject to the existing rules, and the 
right to alienate it. 
We can thus distinguish two categories of land in Singapore: private land, 
enjoyed by the individuals and corporations that are granted estates in land by the 
State, and State land. Both private owners and the State enjoy the right to decide who 
can access or remain on their property.     
                                                
1
 Cap 314, 1996 Rev. Ed. 
2
 For a detailed discussion, see Tan Sook Yee, Principles of Singapore Land Law, 2nd edition, Singapore, 
Butterworth Asia 2001, pp. 27-28. 
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For instance, under the State Lands Encroachments Act3, a person who enters 
or occupies the State land without permission may be prosecuted4. 
In Singapore, as elsewhere, the rights comprised in the concept of ownership 
are not absolute. Apart from the restrictions imposed by the common law, like the law 
of nuisance and negligence, there are also restraints effected through legislation, such 
as planning and zoning laws, environmental and public health laws. More than that, the 
rights of an owner are not “an immutable set of absolute rights”5, meaning that the 
rights of the owner depend on the time and on the society involved.  
Increasingly these days, property rights are seen more as social obligations 
than absolute rights6. As will be shown, in many common law jurisdictions it is 
becoming widely accepted that the owner, be it a private owner or even the State, 
cannot, in every instance, arbitrarily refuse entry or eject from its property those 
members of the public who conduct themselves according to the general law and the 
relevant specific regulations, if any. There are court decisions and in some 
jurisdictions7 there are statutes that limit the owner’s right to exclude all others from 
his land.     
                                                
3
 Cap 315, 1996 Rev.Ed. 
4
 Ibid, ss. 2-7. 
5
 See Tan Sook Yee, Private Ownership of Public Housing in Singapore, Singapore, Times Academic 
Press, 1998, p. 6. 
6
 See Xpress Print Pte Ltd v. Monocrafts Pte Ltd &Anor [2000] 3 SLR 545 at 558. Yong Pung How CJ 
referring to the right of support of land said ”we are of the view that the proposition that a landowner 
may excavate his land with impunity, sending his neighbour’s building and everything in it crashing to 
the ground, is a proposition inimical to a society which respects each citizen’s property rights, and we 
cannot assent to it.”   
7
 In United Kingdom, for example, in the Countryside and Rights of Ways Act 2000 it is established the 
public’s recreational right to access wild tracts of open private land. 
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1.1  Privately owned land 
The right to exclude others has been described as “one of the essential sticks in 
the bundle of property rights”8 and a “fundamental right of the owner of land”9. 
William Blackstone defined the private property as “ the sole and despotic dominion 
…over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe”10. As such, the owner of a private property can decide who 
can gain access to his land, without being required to assign any reason11. He has the 
power to exclude or to evict whomever he wants from his property “subject only to 
such constraints as are imposed by the doctrines of contract or estoppel or by 
legislation prohibiting discrimination on ground of race or gender”12.  
The private owner’s power to arbitrarily evict is rooted historically in the 
medieval action for trespass quare clausum querentis fregit13 and its purpose was to 
support the law of civil liberty and to defend the citizen against the intrusion of the 
State. As Lord Camden CJ noted in Entick v. Carrington14 “by the laws of England 
every invasion of land, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon 
my ground without my licence”15. 
Under a 19th century doctrine, articulated in Wood v. Leadbitter16 and followed 
in the common law jurisdictions, permission to enter private land came to be seen as 
                                                
8
 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins [1980] 447 US 74 at 82, 64 L Ed 2d 741 at 752, per Justice 
Rehnquist. 
9
 See Newbury DC v. Russell [1997] 95 LGR 705 at 713, per Justice Rattee. See also Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. [1982] 458 US 419 at 435, per Marshall J (“ the right to exclude 
is the most valuable element of property”). 
10
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, reprint of the first edition, London, 
Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1996, Vol. II, p.2. 
11
 Justice Ritchie spoke in the Supreme Court of Canada of the “long-standing right of a citizen…to the 
control and enjoyment of his own property, including the right to determine who shall and who shall not 
be permitted to invade it” in Colet v. The Queen [1981] 119 DLR (3rd) 521 at 526. 
12
 Gray, Kevin, ‘ Equitable property’, 1994, 157 Current Legal Problems, p. 172. 
13
 See William Blackstone, supra note 10, Vol. III, p.209. 
14
 [1765] 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 95 ER 807. 
15
 See Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 at 1066, 95 ER 807 at 817. 
16
 [1845] 13 M&W 838 at 844-845, 153 ER 351 at 354, per Alderson, B. 
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revocable at the landowner’s will without prior notice17 and without any 
explanations18. When granting access to his property the owner is also not required to 
follow the doctrine of natural justice19. Generally, the common law has allowed just a 
few derogations from the landowner’s power to arbitrarily exclude unwanted strangers. 
In the absence of an express licence an intruder upon private land has to justify his 
entry by reference to a statutory or common law right of way, a constitutional right or a 
fundamental freedom. Excepting circumstances of humanitarian necessity20 or of 
preventing or prosecuting a crime21, no reason can prevent the unconsented intrusion 
into a private property from amounting to an actionable trespass. 
In its conventional strict form this common law rule does not differentiate 
between different kinds of land, by which I mean the different uses to which the land 
might be put. For example, the rule would apply in much the same degree to land used 
for domestic purposes as well as to a vast tract of open land. For this reason it is now 
being increasingly debated whether the unqualified exclusory privilege can continue to 
be an inevitable incident of property in land, regardless of the use to which it is put. 
Even though today the owner of a private house still retains his absolute 
powers of eviction, yet when it comes to premises open for public use and enjoyment it 
is increasingly argued in some common law jurisdictions that the owner’s rights of 
exclusion should be curtailed. Different doctrines support the public’s right of access 
to these types of property. 
                                                
17 Lambert v. Roberts [1981] 2 ALL ER 15 at 19d, per Donaldson, LJ. 
18
 See Russo v. Ontario Jockey Club [1986] 46 DLR (4th) 359 at 361, per Boland J. 
19
 See Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission [1977] 137 CLR 487 at 511, per Aickin 
J.; Russo v. Ontario Jockey Club [1986] 46 DLR (4th) 359 at 362, per Boland J. 
20
 See Swales v. Cox [1981] QB 849 at 853 F, per Donaldson J. - the humanitarian necessity requires 
that the access to private property is permitted in order to preserve or protect life or to prevent or remedy 
serious physical harm arising to another person. See also R v. Macooh [1993] 105 DLR (4th) 96 at 104 
per Lamer CJC; R v. Godoy [1997] 115 CCC (3rd) 272 at 284-287, per Finlayson, JA.. 
21
 See Swales v. Cox (1981) QB 849 at 853 F,855A- 855C, per Donaldson LJ; Plenty v. Dillon (1991) 
171 CLR 635 at 647, per Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 
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First, under the “prescriptive”22 doctrine, usage by members of the public over 
a long period of time is said to deprive a private owner of the right to exclude the 
public from those kinds of property intended for public use. The reasoning is either 
that such usage implies that the private owner “dedicated” the right of way to the 
public or that the usage allows the public to take a property interest by analogy to 
adverse possessions23.  
Second, there is the doctrine of “implied dedication” which was, according to 
Joseph Angell and Thomas Durfee24, the more common doctrine. In their treatise on 
highway, they stated that the first recorded case of a landowner’s “implied dedication” 
of a road to public occurred in England in 1732 and that the doctrine had had much 
influence in mid-nineteen century25. According to this doctrine, when an owner opens 
his land to public use it could be inferred that he intended to give an “easement” over 
his land to all members of the public. Being a completed gift, he and his successors 
could not later repudiate this dedication. 
The doctrine of “implied dedication” has been subject to much discussion. For 
example, it was said that no one could make a gift to the public because the public was 
not a sufficiently specific donee26. However, by the later nineteenth century American 
courts found a way around this doctrinal problem. Instead of looking at the public’s 
competence to receive property, the courts focused on the “donor’s” act and asserted 
that although the public’s claim to ownership was weak, the landowner’s was even 
weaker: the owner’s own acts estopped him from claiming that those to whom he had “ 
                                                
22
 See Carol Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property’, 
1986, 711 University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 53, nr. 3, p.724, in Private and Common Property, 
edited by Richard A. Epstein, New York: Garland Publications, 2000, p. 298.  
23
 Ibid, p. 298. 
24
 J. Angell & T. Durfee,  A Treatise on the Law of Highways [1857] cited in Carol Rose, supra note 22, 
at p. 298. 
25
 J. Angell & T. Durfee,  A Treatise on the Law of Highways, [1857] p. 133 cited in Carol Rose, supra 
note 22, at p. 298. 
26
 J. Angell & T. Durfee, A Treatise on the Law of Highways, [1857] p. 135, cited in Carol rose, supra 
note 22, at p. 299. 
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given” his property were not competent to receive it27. Another problem raised was the 
requirement of clear manifestation of the owner’s intent to dedicate his property to 
public use. When the intent was not very clear, the courts ruled that the owner’s 
dedication could be inferred from public use alone, if it went long enough, usually 
twenty years28. 
Third, in more recent years in many common law jurisdictions there is 
increasing support for the view that unlimited powers of exclusion are inconsistent 
with basic principles of freedom and dignity29. The traditional law of trespass, as 
symbolized in Wood v. Leadbitter30, rests upon a supposedly clear dichotomy between 
public and private powers. But this strict dichotomy does not accord with the reality of 
modern conditions31. It is argued that the private property “is never truly private”32 and 
according to Chief Justice Weintraub of the Supreme Court of New Jersey  “ a man’s 
right in his real property […] is not absolute. It is a maxim of the common law that one 
should so use his property as not to injure the rights of others […] the rights are 
relative and there must be an accommodation when they meet”33. 
 It can thus be seen that in recent years there is growing support for the position 
that arbitrary powers of exclusion can no longer apply to all types of land. Instead the 
owner’s powers of exclusion depend on the use to which the land might be put. The 
rule of “arbitrary exclusion” still applies to land intended for purely private use and 
enjoyment. The owner of a dwelling house has still the “full right to decide whether he 
                                                
27
 See, for instance, Smith v. City of San Luis Obispo, [1892] 95 Cal. 463 at 470, 30 P. 591 at 593, per 
Haynes J. 
28
 See Odiorne v. Wade, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 421 (1828);  Devenpeck v. Lambert, 44 Barb. 596 (NY Sup. 
Ct. 1865), cited by Carol Rose, supra note 22, at p.299. 
29
 See R. v. Asante- Mensah, 1996 Ont. CJ LEXIS 1959 (May 8, 1996), per Hill J. 
30
 [1845] 13 M& W 838, 153 ER 351. 
31
 See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co, [1991] 819 P2d 55 at 60, per Mullarkey J for negation of the 
“simplistic division of the universe into public and private sphere”. 
32
 See Gray, Kevin, ‘Property in Thin Air’, (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 297-299. 
33See State v. Shack [1971] 277 A2d 369 at 373, per Weintraub CJ. 
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will receive strangers as visitors”34. As such, he can still use his almost unlimited 
exclusory powers to deny access to or evict someone from his land35. The old common 
law saying “ the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress” applies even 
now to this particular type of private property. The “arbitrary exclusion rule” applies to 
all kinds of private property that is not used or intended to be used by the general 
public. The owner of such property can grant access to his land to the people he 
approves of by way of bare licence, a licence that can be revoked at his own will36. He 
enjoys an unchallengeable discretion to withhold or withdraw permission to enter. 
Revocation of the bare licence that invited people on his property does not require 
prior notice37, an objectively reasonable cause38 or an obligation to provide a rationally 
communicable explanation, either before or after, for any particular act of exclusion39.  
In respect of “quasi-public” places40, namely private property characterized by 
or deliberately intended for public use, different approaches are taken across the 
common law countries. It should be mentioned that the phrase “quasi-public” property 
was used in the American case law in the late 19th century and in the beginning of the 
20th century in order to illustrate “ the assets of private companies regulated by the 
Courts in the public interest”41. Nowadays the term is used especially in the United 
                                                
34
 See Martin v. City of Struthers [1943] 319 US 141 at 147, 87 L Ed 1313 at 1319, per Justice Black. 
35
 Justice Estey stated in Lyons v. The Queen [1985] 14 DLR (4th) 482 at 501-502 that the home “is not 
castle in isolation, it is a castle in a community and draws its support and security of existence from the 
community. The law has long recognized many compromises and outright intrusions on the literal sense 
of this concept “. For justifications that prevent entrance on somebody else’s land to amount to trespass 
see discussion above at p. 5-6. 
36
 See Wood v. Leadbitter [1845] 13 M&W 838 at 844-845, 153 ER 351 at 354, per Alderson B. Also 
see Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v. Millennium Productions Ltd [1948] AC 173 at 188-189, per 
Lord Simond. 
37
 See Lambert v. Roberts [1981] 2 All ER 15 at 19d, per Donaldson LJ. 
38
 See Russo v. Ontario Jockey Club [1988] 46 DLR (4th) 359 at 364, per Boland J; also Plenty v. Dillon 
[1991] 171 CLR 635 at 655, per Gaudron and McHugh JJ.. 
39
 See Russo v. Ontario Jockey Club [1988] 46 DLR (4th) 359 at 361-362, per Boland J. 
40
 See Gray, Kevin and Gray, Susan Francis, ‘Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space’, 
(1999) European Human Rights Law Review 46. 
41
 See Slaughter v. Commonwealth [1856] 54 Va 767 at 776, cited in Kevin Gray, Susan Francis Gray, 
‘Private Property and Public Propriety’, in J. McLean (ed), Property and the Constitution, (Hart 
Publishing 1999) at p. 38. 
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States and Canada to denote land which, although private property, is open to public 
use through unrestricted and general invitation. As a result, it is private property that 
can no longer be regarded as pure private zone42. 
These ‘quasi-public” spaces are “imperfectly described in terms of 
ownership”43 so they cannot be governed by the same absolute rules as the private 
dwelling houses. One view is that public policy now urges that in respect of these 
categories of land the law should confirm the existence of a right to equal and 
reasonable access for all members of the public. Murphy J pointed out in Forbes v. 
New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd that “ when one departs from the purely domestic 
area of householder and from contracts affecting only individuals into the sphere 
where there is an accumulation of rights the exercise of which affects the public to a 
significant degree, then increasingly, requirements of due process are imposed and 
arbitrary and unreasonable conduct is not permitted”44.  
It is argued that the bare licence that permits the public to go to privately 
owned property should not be revocable at will, on wholly irrational grounds or 
without showing any good cause45. For example, the private owner of a shopping 
centre should not be allowed to exclude someone from its property “simply for 
wearing a green hat or a paisley tie”46 or because that person has “blond hair, or…is 
from Pennsylvania”47. Chief Justice Laskin voiced incredulity that “an ancient legal 
concept, trespass [should be] urged …in all its pristine force by a shopping centre 
                                                
42
 See R v. Layton [1988] 38 CCC (3d) 550 at 568 per Scott, Prov.CJ; Harrison v. Carswell [1975] 62 
DLR (3d) 68 at 73, per Laskin J. 
43
 Gray and Gray, ‘Private Property and Public Propriety’, in J. McLean (ed), Property and the 
Constitution (Hart Publishing 1999) at 25-26. 
44 See Forbes v. New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd [1979] 143 CLR 242 at 276, per Murphy J. 
45
 See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown [1991] 765 F Supp 181 at 183, where Justice 
Sarokin expressed the opinion that  “enforcement [of library exclusion policy] cannot be left to the 
whim or personal vagaries of the persons in charge …[W]e cannot-we dare not- cross the threshold of 
barring persons from entering because of how they appear based upon the unfettered discretion of 
another.” 
46
 See Brooks v. Chicago Downs Association, Inc [1986] 791 F2d 512 at 514, per Flaum CJ. 
47
 Ibid at 518, per Flaum CJ. 
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owner in respect of areas […] which have been opened by him to public use…To say 
in such circumstances that [he] may, at his whim, order any member of the public out 
of the shopping centre on penalty of liability for trespass if he refuses to leave, does 
not make sense if there is no proper reason in that member’s conduct or activity to 
justify the order to leave”48. 
In recent years a growing number of court decisions recognize that members of 
the public can be evicted from certain locations, namely those open for public 
enjoyment, only for unreasonable or unlawful behaviour. It has been argued that this 
category of land whose use is coloured by public interest requires that access and 
exclusion cannot be left to be governed by the sole discretion of its owner. Thus it can 
be said that the right to exclude from these privately held premises is becoming 
qualified by an overriding principle of reasonableness. In respect of these types of 
property, in many common law jurisdictions it would seem that there is a tendency to 
move from an arbitrary exclusion rule towards a reasonable access rule.  
1.2  State owned land  
As mentioned above, in Singapore all land that is not held in private hands 
belongs to the State. Section 2 of the Singapore Land Authority Act49 defines State 
land as all land in Singapore that has not been granted or leased to private individuals 
by or on behalf on the Government or has not been dedicated as public parks or nature 
reserves50. 
The approach taken by the Singapore law seems to be that the State can decide 
who enters onto and who remains on its property in much the same way as a private 
                                                
48 Harrison v. Carswell [1975] 62 DLR (3d) 68 at 73, per Laskin CJC. . 
49
 The State Land Authority Act, Cap. 301, 2002 Rev. Ed. 
50
 Ibid, s. 2. 
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owner. The State Land Encroachment Act51 provides examples of what constitutes 
trespassing on State land: erection of buildings without approval52, unlawful 
possession53, unlawful depositing, placing or throwing of any article, thing, waste or 
refuse54, unlawful cutting of timber55 and unlawful depasturing56. This Act also gives 
the State a general right to proceed against trespassers; it does not limit its rights to the 
above-mentioned specific instances of trespassing. Section 19 of the State Land 
Encroachment Act states that “nothing in this Act shall be held to deprive the 
Government of any right to proceed under the law, or of any remedy against 
trespassers given by the law”57. 
 The view has been expressed elsewhere that all members of the public should 
enjoy a right to access and use State property because of the specific nature of this type 
of property58. The Supreme Court of Canada held in relation to a government-owned 
airport that although the government’s proprietary rights were the same as those of a 
private owner59, nevertheless it is not entitled within its absolute discretion to exclude 
members of the public from its property60. The reason is that unlike a private owner 
who uses his land for his own benefit, the State owns its land for the benefit of the 
public. This could be said to be a trust-like situation with the State as trustee holding 
the land for the benefit of the public61. Accordingly, it could restrict the public’s access 
                                                
51
 The State Land Encroachment Act, Cap. 315, 1996 Rev. Ed.  
52
 Ibid, s. 6(1). 
53
 Ibid, s. 7 (1) a. 
54
 Ibid, s. 7 (1) b. 
55
 Ibid, s. 7 (2). 
56
 Ibid, s 13. 
57
 Ibid, s. 19. 
58
 Rose, Carol- ‘ The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property’, 
the University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 53, nr. 3, 1986, p. 724, in Private and Common Property, 
edited by Richard A. Epstein, New York: Garland Publications, 2000, p. 298. 
59
 See The Queen in Right of Canada v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada [1991] 77 DLR 
(4th) 385 at 402e, per La Forest J. 
60
 Ibid at 393 d-h, per Lamer CJC, Sopinka and Cory JJ concurring; 402f, per La Forest J; 421h-422b, 
per L’Heureux-Dube J; 449d-450c, per McLachlin J. 
61
 Ibid at 393d, per Lamer CJC – the State property is “quasi-fiduciary” in nature. 
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to some or all its lands or it could prohibit exercise of one or more public rights on its 
property only if there are sufficient and compelling reasons based on public policy. 
The argument that the State holds its land in trust for the public is not the only 
possible reason why the State should not be allowed to arbitrarily regulate the access to 
its property. It is submitted that there is another equally if not more compelling reason 
why the State cannot act the same way as a private owner in respect of its property 
open for public use. It is suggested that use and purpose to which the land is put is a 
better basis for restricting the State’s exclusory powers. Once land is open to public 
use and enjoyment, the State cannot deny access or evict members of the public 
without good reasons, based on the use to which the land is put. If this were not so it 
could be said that the State was derogating from its invitation.   
It should also be noted that there are State owned lands intended for restricted 
use to which members of the public do not enjoy free access to it. In respect of these 
kinds of land the State is not required to give strong, compelling reasons when denying 
access to its property. Examples of such State land not intended for public use are 
generally unoccupied, vacant land intended for development or places intended for 
specific purposes to which members of the public are not allowed access for reasons of 
safety or security (e.g. the judges’ chambers, the airport control tower).  
1.3  The emerging principle of the public’s right to reasonable access  
As mentioned above, a new principle is emerging in the common law world, 
namely the public’s right of reasonable access to property open to public use. Members 
of the public are invited on these types of land through general or unrestricted 
invitation and, as a consequence, the land becomes a public place. The principle of 
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reasonableness accommodates the rights of the owner with those of members of the 
public. This principle, it is submitted, should apply to both State and private property 
open for public use, and it should regulate the conduct of both owner and members of 
the public. 
It should be noted that the delineation of special rules for the properties open 
for public is not a startling innovation in the common-law system. The common law 
tradition has long accepted that the property affected by public interest is not 
controlled by the arbitrary principles of the trespass law, because it “ceases to be juris 
privati only”62. As Chief Justice Waite said in Munn v. Illinois63, “ when […] one 
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he […] grants to the 
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the 
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created”64. 
The best illustration is provided by the old example of the innkeeper, who in 
the absence of some reasonable ground of refusal, has always been bound by the 
common law and custom to receive and provide lodging in his inn for all travellers65. 
Across the common law jurisdictions it was well known that the “ the business of an 
innkeeper is of quasi-public character, and is burdened with correspondingly great 
responsibilities”66. The innkeepers are considered “a sort of public servants”, that have 
“in return a kind of privilege of entertaining travelers and supplying them with what 
they want”67. Consequently, he is neither entitled to select his guests nor to exclude 
them in an arbitrary manner. 
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 Hale, ‘ De Portibus Maris’, 1 Harg L Tr 78, cited in Kevin Gray, Susan Francis Gray, Elements of 
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64 Munn v. Illinois [1876] 94 US 113 at 126, 24 L Ed 77 at 84, per Waite, CJ. 
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566 at 566, per Eyres J; Lamond v. Richards [1897] 1 QB 541 at 547, per Lopes LJ. 
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 See De Wolf v. Ford (1908) 86 NE 527 at 529, per Werner J. 
67
 See R v. Ivens [1835] 7 C& P 213 at 219, 173 ER 94 at 96-97, per Coleridge J. 
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Our modern living involves our ready access to various places which, whether 
they are held in private or State ownership, are characterized by or are deliberately 
intended for general public use. Examples include parks and leisure areas, airports, 
railway stations, shopping centres, public or private hospitals, museums and libraries. 
It is argued in a fair number of common law jurisdictions that the public’s right to 
access to these types of property is subject to an overriding principle of 
reasonableness.  
The wide recognition across the common law jurisdictions of a reasonable 
public access to extensive tracts of open land held in private hands confirms the trend 
of moderating owner’s rights of exclusion depending on the use to which the land is 
put. Many court decisions support this changing view68 and in United Kingdom, since 
the enactment in 2000 of the Countryside and Right of Way Act, there is even statutory 
protection for the reasonable right to gain access to the open country.  
There are various reasons69 for the changing position taken by common law 
judges and, in case of United Kingdom, legislators. For example, in regard to open 
country, in Australia it is argued that the size of the land impacts upon the owner’s 
absolute power of eviction. Referring to extensive tracts of land, Justice Kirby stated in 
Wik People v. Queensland70 that in respect to such areas ”talk of exclusion possession 
or exclusive occupation has an unreal quality”71. In United States the courts inferred an 
implied licence on the part of private landowners for public access to open land72 while 
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 See McKee v. Grant [1922] 260 US 127; Gerhardy v. Brown [1985] 159 CLR 70; Wik Peoplev. 
Queensland [1996]187 CLR 1. 
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 Ibid at 233, per Kirby J. 
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 See Mckee v. Gratz [1922] 260 US 127 at 136, per Holmes J. 
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in United Kingdom access to open countryside is recognized “for the purpose of open-
air recreation”73. 
As mentioned above the requirement of reasonableness applies to both owner 
and members of the public. It should be mentioned that the “reasonable access” 
principle is not inconsistent with a substantial degree of regulatory control exercised 
by the landowner. He still has the power to make rules regulating the public access and 
the permitted conduct on his property. The principle of reasonableness only eliminates 
the utterly capricious or rationally unjustifiable exercise of exclusory powers.  
It follows from this that the limitations imposed by the owner should be 
expressed in sufficiently clear terms to permit the members of the public to determine 
where and what the limit is. Limits that are vague, uncertain, ambiguous or subject to 
discretionary determination are unreasonable. They inhibit the exercise of public 
rights. As Justice L’Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out 
“vague laws…create paths of uncertainty onto which citizens fear to tread, fearing 
legal sanctions. Vagueness serves only to cause confusion and most people will shy 
from exercising their freedoms rather than facing potential punishment”74. 
In respect of members of the public “reasonable” behaviour implies that their 
conduct should be in accordance with the specific nature of the place and with the 
functions performed there. They should not disturb the legitimate activities of other 
users and they should obey the general law and the specific regulations made by the 
owner. 
For example, those who use a library facility can be expected to comport 
themselves consistently with the fundamental purpose of a library as a place for quiet 
                                                
73
 See the Countryside and Right of Way Act 2000, s 2(1). 
74
 See The Queen in Right of Canada v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada [1991] 77 DLR 
(4th) 385 at 395d, per L’Heureux-Dube J. 
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reading, research and contemplation75. A public library may impose rules of conduct 
on its patrons76 prohibiting disruptive77 or anti-social behaviour or limiting the use of 
the library as merely “a lounge or a shelter”78. It has also been said that, if a person 
tries to picket in the middle of a busy highway or to set up barricades on a bridge, such 
form of expression in such a place is incompatible with the principal function of the 
place, namely to provide for the smooth traffic of automobiles79. In much the same 
way, it has been decided that distribution of leaflets expressing anti-abortion views are 
not compatible with the private hospital’s main function as provider of medical 
services for the community80.  
It can thus be noticed that the principle of “public reasonable access” to 
properties open for public use cuts both ways: it provides clear ground for the 
exclusion of the unreasonable user81 and in the same time provides a right of access 
during good, reasonable behaviour82. 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the Singapore position on the emerging 
principle of public reasonable access. In the subsequent chapters I shall analyse the 
Singapore legislation dealing with public access to different types of land open for 
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public use. I divided such land into three categories, namely State land, land belonging 
to statutory corporations and land belonging to private individuals. I dedicated one 
chapter to each of these three categories in order to show whether reasonable public 
access is recognized and applied in each of the categories. I also attempt to determine 
whether the nature of ownership influenced the Singapore legislation’s approach on the 
principle of reasonable public access. 
It should be mentioned at the onset of this analysis that, to the best of my 
knowledge, in Singapore there is no case law dealing with this matter. On the other 
hand, in other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, Canada, United Kingdom 
and United States, the principle of reasonable access is dealt with predominantly in 
court decisions. Only in United Kingdom is there a statute83 recognizing the reasonable 
public access to open country. Thus I shall discuss relevant court decisions from these 
four jurisdictions in order to give a comparative basis for the position taken in 
Singapore. It is also relevant to mention that not all of the above-mentioned 
jurisdictions have cases dealing with public access to all types of land open for public 
use. For this reason, depending on the type and the intended use of the land, I shall 
discuss relevant court decisions from one or more of these jurisdictions.        
                                                
83
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CHAPTER 2- PUBLIC’S ACCESS TO STATE LAND OPEN FOR PUBLIC 
USE 
The common law is clear that in respect of private property traditionally the 
owner has the right to decide in an unrestricted manner who is allowed to enter or 
remain on his land. In respect of property owned by the State, the right of the State as 
owner to exclude persons from its land may be subject to restrictions, as will be shown 
in the case of streets, foreshores, public parks and libraries. The reason for these 
restrictions is that although it is the State who owns the land, yet the land is for the use 
and benefit of the general public. 
In this chapter I shall consider the position and the rights of the State as owner 
of the land as well as the rights and obligations of members of the public in regard to 
access to this type of property. 
Courts in certain common law jurisdictions have articulated more radical views 
on the issue while others have remained with the conventional approach. I shall give 
first a brief account of the law and approaches of the countries where courts have 
clearly articulated the premises which should govern the reasonable public access 
before discussing the position in Singapore.  
 2.1  Canada  
In Canada the nature of State owned property and the State’s rights to evict 
individuals from its property are discussed in detail in The Queen in Right of Canada 
v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada84. 
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In the case at hand, the government argued that its proprietary rights are no 
different from those of a private owner. Although agreeing to this assertion, the 
Supreme Court decided that since certain types of government property have a public 
function and character (e.g. streets, squares, parks), they should be therefore 
completely open to public manifestation of free expression85.   
In the Court’s view, what should be taken into account is the specific “quasi-
fiduciary” nature of the government property. While the private owner benefits 
personally from his property the government owns its property for the benefit and use 
of all the citizens 86. The government has the right as well as the obligation to manage 
its property for the public good, and for that, depending on the circumstances, can 
sometimes impose certain limitations on fundamental freedoms.   
The government may at times limit the public access to certain places or it can 
act to maintain law and order, but it definitely cannot use its ownership rights for the 
sole purpose of impeding the exercise of a fundamental freedom. Even more, if the 
government could treat its property in the same way as a private citizen, then it will 
accept on its property only the members of the public whose political view accord with 
the government’s preferences. L’Heureux Dube J pointed out that if members of the 
public had no right whatsoever to engage in expressive activity on government-owned 
property, “then there would be little if any opportunity to exercise their rights of 
freedom of expression”87. 
Additionally, the government should not be allowed to adopt regulations that 
are overbroad. The Supreme Court ruled as invalid the regulations that do not specify 
                                                
85 The Queen in Right of Canada v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, supra note 1, at 419, 
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86 Ibid at 393, per Lamer CJC. 
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what particular activity is prohibited but instead simply proclaim that all activities 
involving freedom of expression are not permitted on its property88. 
The Court was also concerned with setting limits to the citizens’ reasonable 
access on the government’s property. The Government’s primary responsibility is to 
ensure that the places it holds for the public’s benefit operate effectively and in 
accordance with their intended purpose. For this reason, the Court held that the 
individual who enters and communicates his ideas on such a place should use a form 
of expression that is compatible with the principal function or intended purpose of the 
place. It should not be that the protection of a person’ freedoms has the effect of 
depriving the citizens as a whole of the efficient operation of government services and 
activities. In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of Canada held that distribution of 
pamphlets and discussion with members of the public were not incompatible with the 
airport’s primary function, “that of accommodating the needs of the traveling 
public”89. This particular form of expression did not impede the airport to operate in 
the same conditions of safety and efficiency. 
Thus in this case the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the public’s 
entitlement to reasonable access and freedom of expression while on State owned 
property.  
2.2   United States  
In United States the opinion has been expressed that the extent to which the 
State can control access to its property varies according to the nature of the relevant 
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land: “the existence of a right of access to public property and the standards by which 
limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of 
the property at issue”90. In  Perry Education Ass’n  v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n91 
the Supreme Court identified three types of State property. 
The first category is the “traditional public forum property” that includes such 
places as streets, parks, public sidewalks which “have immemorially been held in trust 
for the use of the public and …have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”92. To this 
type of State property members of the public enjoy an extensive, almost unlimited 
right of access. In a traditional public forum the State can place restrictions on the 
public access and the free speech only if they are tailored to serve a compelling State 
interest and they are narrowly drawn to achieve that end93. Such compelling State 
interests are the protection of public health, safety and order94 and the efficient and 
orderly use of its property for its primary purpose. The State is also required to leave 
ample alternative channels of communication95. 
The second category is the “designated public forum property” and consists of 
State property that is open to the public as a place for expressive activity. Whether a 
place has been designated for expressive activity is determined by the State’s intent in 
establishing it. Examples of such designated public forum include public libraries96 
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and universities97. The State’s intent is to create State properties open to the public use 
for the purpose of access to and exchange of information and ideas. The State is not 
required to keep such a facility open to the public indefinitely. However, as long as the 
dedicated public forum is open to the public, the State is bound by the same standards 
that apply to the traditional public forum. 
The last category of State property identified by the Supreme Court in Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’Ass’n98  “is not by tradition or designation a 
forum for public communication”99. This category comprises both State property open 
for public use but not primarily for expressive activities (e.g. State hospitals) and State 
property not intended for public access. State limitations on expressive activities in 
such places “need only be reasonable as long as the regulation is not an effort to 
suppress the speaker’s activities due to disagreement with the speaker’s views”100.  
2.3   Singapore  
Singapore courts have not as far as I am aware pronounced on the issue. 
Singapore legislation on State owned land on the other hand does not differentiate 
between a private owner and the State in respect of their power to evict unwanted 
individuals from their property. It does not expressly impose on the State a general 
requirement of “reasonableness”, but as will be shown below, the existence of the 
principle can be inferred from the rules adopted by the State regulating the people’s 
permitted conduct on its property. 
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I shall consider the Singapore position on the principle of “reasonable access” 
in the context of four kinds of State owned land, namely streets, foreshores, public 
parks and libraries.   
2.3.1   Streets  
In Singapore there are two categories of streets, the public streets that are 
vested in the Government and private streets that may be constructed and owned by 
private individuals or corporations.   
2.3.1.1   Public streets  
In Singapore the public’s rights to use the streets are regulated by the Street 
Works Act101. Together with the Street Works (Obstructions in public places) 
Regulations102, the Act imposes restrictions on all members of the public when using 
the public streets.  
Under the Street Works Act, all public streets, public bridges, underpasses and 
tunnels, the road pavement and road related facilities thereon are vested in the 
Government103. The Land Transport Authority, a statutory corporation104, is given the 
power to maintain, manage and repair all public streets, including the footways and 
road related facilities105. Section 2 defines the public streets as any street over which 
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the public has a right of way106. A right of way is not defined in the Act, thus the 
common law meaning would apply.  
At common law, the public enjoys extensive rights on public highways. It used 
to be thought that the rights of members of the public over the public highway were 
confined to “a right to pass and repass at their pleasure for the purpose of legitimate 
travel”107 and also for “purposes incidental to passage”108. Such ancillary purposes 
could be “stopping to tie up your shoe lace, consulting a street map, or pausing to catch 
one’s breath”109, or sitting down and resting, repairing a minor damage at one’s car or 
queuing for tickets at a theatre or for a bus110, and are permissible as long as they are 
limited in duration to “a reasonable while” and are exercised “reasonably and in such a 
way as not unduly to obstruct other users”111. The user of highway for other purposes, 
whether lawful or unlawful, was usually considered a trespass against the owner of the 
highway and could also involve a criminal obstruction of that highway.112As Lord 
Irvine LC noticed in DPP v. Jones113, this unnecessarily restrictive approach 
threatened to impose trespass liability in respect of a range of totally innocent and 
reasonable activities on the public highways114. 
In DPP v. Jones115, the majority of the House of Lords considerably expanded 
the scope of the public right, and adopting a “reasonable user’ test”, they ruled that no 
trespass on the highway is committed by the people conducting activities that are 
“reasonable, do not involve the commission of a private or public nuisance, and do not 
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amount to an obstruction of the highway unreasonably impeding the primary right of 
the general public to pass and repass”116. Lord Irvine LC also indicated that the 
permitted public user may, in certain circumstances, extend to “roaming about on the 
highway, or remaining on the highway”, provided that such use is consistent with the 
public’s primary right of passage117. Lord Clyde was more restrictive, saying that a 
person cannot simply wander about the road at will, and that any stopping and standing 
must be reasonably limited in time:” While the right may extend to a picnic on the 
verge, it would not extend to camping there”118. 
The “reasonable user” test was applied in DPP v. Jones to uphold a public right 
of peaceful non-obstructive assembly on the public highways, although the same test 
does not “afford carte blanche to squatters or uninvited visitors” and would not support 
any claim of right to gather on, and obstruct, a narrow footpath or bridleway119. The 
test clearly does not allow any use of the highway which is unreasonable, obstructive 
or liable to constitute a nuisance120. Whether the use made of the highway by a 
member of the public is “so unreasonable as to amount to obstruction” is a question of 
fact and degree in every case121. It is considered though that the offence of obstruction 
is committed when members of the public engage themselves in activities that, 
although not impeding on the public’s primary right of passage, are deemed to be 
unpleasant, socially undesirable or obtrusive in relation to passers by122. 
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In short, the common law meaning used to be a narrow one, conferring only “a 
legitimate right to pass and repass […] for the purpose of legitimate travel”123 and also 
for “purposes incidental to passage”124. However, this narrow view has been broadened 
by DPP v. Jones125 which applied a “reasonable user” test. Accordingly, since the 
definition of the right of way is that as at common law it is thus suggested that the 
wider “reasonable user” test should also apply in Singapore. In brief, members of the 
public can conduct any activity in public streets as long as these activities do not 
amount to private or public nuisance or do not amount to an obstruction which 
impedes the public’s right to pass and repass.  
A recent example of closure of street in Ang Mo Kio clearly demonstrates the 
public’s rights of access to public streets. On 11 July 2003 the Land Transport 
Authority together with the Home Affairs Ministry gave permission to ST 
Microelectronics, a semiconductor supplier operating several plants in the area, to 
close 150 metres stretch of road. The closure resulted in a bus service being diverted 
leaving commuters to find alternative ways of getting to work.  The workers at other 
factories in the area complained about the closure because, given the public nature of 
the street, they have a right to use it and it was “unfair” to them to spend more time 
and money travelling. The Land Transport Authority explained that the reasons behind 
the street closure were “possible security threats” promised to work with the Singapore 
Bus System to come up with a solution for helping them126. 
Additionally, the Act contains specific provisions setting out what may or may 
not be done in public streets. No person is allowed to carry out any work on any public 
street, bridge or on any street that is to be declared public unless he has obtained the 
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prior approval of the Authority127. Also if any person willfully removes, destroys or 
damages any property belonging to the government by virtue of this Act or acquired by 
the Government for the purpose thereof or hinders or prevents such property from 
being used or operated in the manner it is intended to be used or operated, he shall be 
guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $ 10000 
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or both128. 
It is also an offence to remove any mark set up for the purpose of indicating 
any level or direction necessary to the execution of work authorized by the Street 
Works Act129. No person is allowed to deposit or cause or allow any article or thing to 
remain in or on the public street, as to create any obstruction or inconvenience to the 
passage of the public on such street130  
2.3.1.2   Private streets  
The second category of streets -the private streets, are owned by the persons 
who constructed them on their land. However, in the case of the private streets, the 
Land Transport Authority may give written directions to the person wishing to 
construct them with regard to the compliance with the Street Works Act and the 
legislation made thereunder. For example, it may direct the line of the new street, so as 
to ensure that it forms a continuous street with any existing or proposed street; it may 
decree the level, the material used and the manner of construction of the street, 
provisions for footways and the size of the same131.  
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It follows from these provisions that the private streets, although privately 
owned, have a public dimension and it is assumed that they are open for general public 
use. The private streets are in fact public places and the principle of “reasonableness’ 
should apply in respect of use and access in the same manner it applies to the public 
streets Also where any part of a private street is in a defective condition, and if the 
Authority is satisfied that the safety of the public requires that action should be taken, 
it can order the owners of the adjoining premises or any person who, in the opinion of 
the Authority, was responsible for causing the dangerous condition, to execute such 
works as may be necessary to remedy the defect132.  
. As long as members of the public keep their conduct within the law, the 
owner should not arbitrarily deny a person’s entry or evict him from the private streets.    
 2.3.2  Foreshores  
It is assumed from certain statutory provisions that the foreshores belong to the 
State. Under section 9 (1) of the Foreshores Act133 the President has the power to lease 
the foreshore and the sea-bed for a term not exceeding 100 years134. The President may 
also rent or farm, either in one or several lots by public sale or by public tender, the use 
of the beaches and banks of the sea135. The Act also entitles the Commissioner of 
Lands or the Collector of Land Revenue deputed by him in that behalf to grant licences 
for temporary occupation for any period not exceeding one year136.  
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The right of the public to freely access the foreshores is not provided by 
legislation, but at common law the public has rights over the sea, the seabed and 
foreshore, such as the right to fish137, to navigate138 and a right of recreation139. It 
would seem that the Foreshores Act recognizes these common law rights. For example, 
the leases made by the President should not create a substantial infringement of “public 
rights”140. Also no temporary licence granted under the Act shall be renewed if it is 
made to appear to the Minister that the licence creates a substantial infringement of 
“public rights”141.  Additionally public rights are mentioned in an Urban 
Redevelopment Authority planning policy142 which says 15 metres of public 
beachfront area must be free of structures for easy public access at all times. This 
policy is reflected in s. 3 of the Foreshores Act, which states that no person shall erect 
or build any sea wall or river wall or erect any permanent building or structure within 
15 metres of the foreshore or of any such bank, except in accordance with the plans 
and specifications approved by the Urban Redevelopment Authority143. It is thus 
suggested that the public use and enjoyment of the foreshores is based on common 
law. 
It is also suggested that even though the right to free public access and 
enjoyment of the foreshores is recognized by the law because of the public nature and 
the use to which the land is put, individual members of the public should conduct 
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themselves so as not to be in breach of the general law. The State and its agents on the 
other hand should not arbitrarily deny access to or evict them from the foreshores.   
2.3.3  Public Parks  
In Singapore the national parks, nature reserves and parklands are managed and 
controlled by the National Parks Board, a body corporate with perpetual succession, 
capable of acquiring, owning, holding, developing and disposing of property, both 
movable and immovable144. The Board was established under the repealed National 
Parks Act in force before 1st July 1996 and continued by section 3 of the present 
National Parks Act (Cap. 198A, 1996 Ed.). 
The main functions of the Board are to control and administer the national 
parks and nature reserves145, to be an agent of the Government in the management and 
maintenance of the green areas 146and to provide and promote recreational, cultural, 
research and educational facilities in national parks, nature reserves and parklands and 
encourage their full and proper use by members of the public147. 
The national parks are State property. The National Parks Board only manages 
the national parks, nature reserves and parklands. Section 20 of the National Parks Act 
states that from 1st of July 1996 all movable property vested in the Government 
immediately before that date for the purposes of the Parks and Recreation Department 
were transferred and vested in the Board without further assurance148. Since the Act 
does not mention the transfer of the unmovable property, it means that the land itself is 
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still State land149 vested in the Government. Although controlled and administered by a 
statutory corporation, the nature reserves, national parks and parklands still retain their 
public nature. It is significant that all of the Board’s regulations are made with the 
Minister’s approval150. The chief executive is appointed only after the Board’s 
consultation with the Public Service Commission and with the approval of the 
Minister151. He can only be removed from office with the consent of the Minister152. It 
should also be noted that all members, employees and agents of the National Parks 
Board are deemed to be public servants153. 
Access to public parks is granted to all members of the public. Section 23 states 
that the national parks and nature reserves are dedicated, set aside and reserved for the 
recreational and educational use by “the public”154. The provisions which regulate the 
use and enjoyment of the parks frequently use terms such as “no person” or “any 
person”. For example, “no person” shall bring or cause any animal to be brought into a 
nature reserve or permit any domestic animal to stay into a nature reserve155, and “any 
person” who fails to comply with these provisions shall be guilty of an offence and 
shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $ 10000 or to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 6 months or both156. 
 It is thus clear from the provisions of the National Parks Act that the reason for 
their existence and also the purpose of the public parks is to serve all members of the 
public. The public is only permitted to enter and leave the park’s premises through the 
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entrances and exits provided for that purpose157. It is also required that all persons who 
access and use the park’s facilities not to be under the influence of a controlled drug or 
in a state of intoxication158.  
The Board is entitled to make regulations prescribing the days and times of 
admission to the natural parks, nature reserves and parklands159 and also the fees 
payable in respect of admission160. Members of the public who access the public parks 
are required to obey both the general law that governs the people’s conduct on public 
places and the specific regulations made by the National Parks Board concerning the 
preservation of order and the prevention of nuisance161, the preservation and protection 
of plants, animal and property162 or the prohibition of any particular act therein163. 
For instance, no one is allowed to damage, destroy or deface any object of 
scientific, or aesthetic interest164 or to damage or remove any notice, boundary mark or 
other thing whatsoever within the public parks165. Failure to obey these rules is an 
offence and if found guilty the person is liable to a fine not exceeding $ 10000 or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or both166. Also any person who 
obstructs or hinders any employee or agent of the National Parks Board in the 
discharge of his duty shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a 
fine not exceeding $ 5000 or to imprisonment for a term up to 6 months or both167. 
The National Parks Regulations set out in detail the prohibited activities within 
the public parks boundaries. According to these regulations no person is permitted to 
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throw, deposit or leave behind any refuse, litter or article except in a litterbin provided 
for that purpose168 or to bathe or wash in any body of water169. Without the permission 
of the chief executive170, no one can kindle or cause any fire171, climb any wall, fence, 
tree, post or other structure172, remove or displace any seat, barrier, post or ornament173 
or hang or affix any light, bill, placard, notice or other thing on any plant, tree or 
structure174. Some activities that the public may engage in, like holding a barbeque, 
erecting a tent or shelter or leaving a boat unattended, require a valid permit issued for 
that purpose by the chief executive or any person authorized by the chief executive in 
that behalf175. There are also provisions that prohibit obscene or indecent behaviour in 
the public parks. No person is allowed to undress or to be in an undressed state176 or to 
use obscene or offensive language177. 
The Board also sets out restrictions relating to vehicles. For example, without 
the permission of the chief executive, no person shall ride or drive a motor vehicle 
within the park boundaries except within the area designated as a carpark or on any 
road designated for access to such carpark178. No one is allowed to obstruct with his 
vehicle any entrance, exit, road or path or the entrance to any building179. Under the 
National Parks Act any police officer or employee or agent of the Board is empowered 
to remove from any vehicle brought or left within the national park, nature reserve or 
parkland in contravention of the Act or any regulations made thereunder or which is 
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likely to cause danger or obstruction180. The chief executive shall give notice in writing 
to the owner of the removal, and if the vehicle is not claimed by its owner within one 
month of the date of its removal, the chief executive may sell it or otherwise dispose of 
such vehicle181. 
Contravention of or failure to comply with any of these regulations are 
considered as offences and any person found guilty should be liable to a fine not 
exceeding $ 5000182. A police officer or an employee or agent of the Board may order 
a person who contravenes or who in his opinion is about to contravene any provisions 
of the National Parks Act or of the National Parks Regulation to leave the designated 
the parks premises183. If that person fails or refuses to leave the national park, nature 
reserve or parkland after being requested to do so the police officer or the Board’s 
agent or employee may arrest him without a warrant184. 
To recapitulate, the public parks belong to the State. The National Parks Board 
manages them and also controls and regulates the public’s right of access185. Both 
National Parks Act and National Parks Regulations allow general access to all 
members of the public, subject to restrictions. These proscribe certain behaviour while 
in the public parks and are based on the principle that the property is open for all to 
enjoy. Accordingly, behaviour which disturbs or prevents enjoyment by others is not 
permitted. 
In regard to access to the parks the Board or its employee cannot refuse entry to 
any individual186 and is required to act reasonably when evicting him subject to his 
conforming to the Regulations. Unlike the private owner, it would appear that the 
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powers of the State, when denying public access to its property, cannot be exercised in 
an arbitrary manner. It would also seem that the State has to act reasonably when 
evicting someone from its property. It can evict only if that person disobeys the general 
law or the specific rules applying to that particular State property. On the other hand, 
the members of the public are also required to behave in a “reasonable” manner and 
not to cause nuisance to other users. Therefore, although there is no statute or court 
decision to establish a principle of “reasonableness” in respect of the public’s access to 
State land intended for public use, it is argued that this principle is implicitly 
recognized.  
Members of the public may assume that they can enjoy unrestricted access to 
such places because it is State property and it is held for their use and benefit. On its 
part the public has to obey both the regulations that have been made concerning the 
permitted conduct on public parks and the general law regulating the permitted 
behaviour in all public places187.   
2.3.4  Public Libraries    
Another category of State property dedicated for public use consists of public 
libraries. Unlike streets, foreshore or even parks, the libraries are public places 
intended only for a strictly defined purpose.     
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In Singapore public libraries are controlled and managed by the National 
Library Board188, a body corporate with perpetual succession, capable of acquiring, 
owning, holding, developing and disposing of property, both movable and 
immovable189.  The Board was established on 1st September 1995 under the National 
Library Board Act190. The main functions of the Board are to establish and maintain 
libraries and to provide library information services191, to promote reading and to 
encourage learning through the use of libraries and their services192. 
The National Libraries are State property. Section 25 (1) of the National 
Library Board Act193 state that starting from 1st September 1995 all movable property 
vested in the Government immediately before that date and used or managed by the 
National Library were transferred and vested to the Board. Since the Act does not 
mention the transfer of the immovable property, it can be inferred that the land itself is 
State land vested in the Government. The public nature of the National Libraries is 
supported by many of the Act’s provisions. For example, all regulations made by the 
Board are required to have the prior approval of the Minister194. Also the chief 
executive officer is appointed by the Board only with the Minister’s consent195. At the 
end of each financial year, the board has to prepare and transmit to the Minister a 
report dealing with all the Board’s activities196. It is also relevant to note that all 
members, officers and employees of the National Library Board are deemed to be 
public servants for the purpose of the Penal Code197. 
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From the provisions of the National Library Board Act it can be inferred that 
access to public libraries is granted to all members of the public. Section 7 (d) of the 
National Library Board Act empowers the Board to coordinate and facilitate access to 
library materials in all public-funded libraries. Also the provisions that regulate the use 
and enjoyment of the public libraries use terms such as “no person” or “any persons”. 
For example, section 22 (2) of the National Library Rules states that “any person” who 
shall contravene the library regulations shall be guilty of an offence, and section 22 (1) 
uses the term “no person” when indicating the prohibited activities in public libraries. 
Also, the National Library Rules define a “reader” as a person who enters the Library 
building to refer to or use any library material therein. It is thus clear that public 
libraries are open for the use of the general public198. 
As manager of National Libraries, the Board is entitled to make regulations 
stipulating the days and times of the public admission199. It can also make rules 
providing for the preservation of order and the prevention of nuisance in the libraries, 
library building and its grounds200. All members of the public who use the library 
facilities are required to obey both the general law and these specific regulations. The 
National Library Rules set out in detail the prohibited activities within a public library.  
For instance, no one is allowed to damage, destroy or remove any library 
material, fitting or furniture belonging to the library201, to engage in audible 
conversation or offensive behaviour, to use abusive or obscene language which may 
cause annoyance or disturbance to other persons in the library202. Also eating, drinking 
or smoking is not permitted while on the library’s premises203. No person is permitted 
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to sleep or lie on the benches, chairs or tables in the library204 or to enter the premises 
being offensively unclean or intoxicated205. 
Contravention of these regulations is considered offence and the person found 
guilty is liable to a fine not exceeding $1000. The Library Director and any officer of 
the Library have the power to evict and subsequently to refuse entry to any person who 
behaves in a disorderly or improper manner or who fails to comply with the 
regulations. 
It can be inferred from both the National Library Board Act and its subsidiary 
Rules that all members of the public are allowed to gain access to the public library’s 
materials, but such access is subject to certain restrictions. They are permitted to enter 
the library premises only on the prescribed days and time. They are required to obey 
the general law and the specific regulations, to act in such way as not to obstruct or 
interfere with the normal functions of the place and not to disturb other library users. 
Thus, as long as members of the public behave in a reasonable manner they should not 
be evicted or refused entrance to the libraries. It is thus argued that although in 
Singapore legislation the principle of reasonable access to State owned land open for 
public use is not expressly established, it is nevertheless implicitly recognized. 
As we can see from the discussion above, the Singapore approach is very 
precise and it is based on specific legislation and rules which exhibit the existence of 
the principle of reasonable public access. On the other hand, the approach taken in 
other common-law jurisdictions is general and based mainly on court decisions. For 
example, in regard of public libraries, while in Singapore the public’s rights are to be 
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found in the National Library Board Act206 and in the specific regulations in the United 
States they are discussed in detail in the case law. 
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association207 the 
Supreme Court of the United States identified three types of State property for the 
purpose of analyzing the degree of protection afforded to free speech and assembly, 
namely the traditional public forum, encompassing such areas as streets, parks and 
public sidewalks, the limited or designated forum consisting of “public property which 
the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity”208 and the 
non-public forum which is not by tradition or dedication a forum for public 
communication209 and is intended for restricted use. 
In that categorization public libraries are dedicated public forum210. However, 
the court noted that public libraries are not open for the exercise of all kinds of 
expressional activities. When dedicating one of its properties as an expressional forum, 
the State allows members of the public to exercise only those expressional rights that 
are consistent with the functions performed on that place. A library’s intended use, for 
example, is a quite place for reading, studying, for expressing and receiving ideas. It 
provides access not only to books, newspapers and magazines but also to concerts, 
lectures and exhibitions. As such, the public is permitted to exercise its rights of free 
speech or free assembly as long as they do not interfere with the library’s proper 
functioning. For example, it is permitted to wear political campaign buttons or black 
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armbands but not to give speeches or holding rallies211. Walking barefoot in a public 
library is not in regarded as a “symbolic speech” because it does not “convey a 
particularized message”. It is just a personal goal “that bears little relation to a 
political, religious or ideological issue of public concern”212. 
The American courts also ruled that library facilities should be open to all 
members of public213, without discrimination214. The reason given by the judges was 
that all individuals have a right to free expression that includes not only the right to 
disseminate ideas but also the right to receive it215. In their view, public libraries are 
“traditional public forum whose accessibility affects the bedrock of [the American] 
democratic system”216. 
 In Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown217 Justice Sarokin 
described public libraries as “great symbols of democracy” because “it includes voices 
of dissent”. In much the same way, the Supreme Court held in Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley218 that once a public forum is opened for “assembly or speaking by 
some groups” the State may not prohibit others “from assembling or speaking on the 
basis of what they intend to say”219. It is required to “afford all points of view an equal 
opportunity to be heard”220.  Consequently, it has been held that the State, as owner, 
and the library boards of trustees, as managers, have the right to make rules regulating 
the public’s permitted conduct on the library’s premises, but that their rights to “limit 
                                                
211
 See Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, [1998] 24 F Supp 2d 552 at 563, 
per Brinkema, DJ. 
212
 See Neinast v. Board of Trustees of the Columbus Metropolitan Library [2002] 190 F Supp 2d 1040 
at 1045-1046, per Marbley, DJ. 
213
 See Brinkmeier v. City of Freeport [1993] US Dist. LEXIS 9255 (July 2, 1993), per Reinhard, DJ. 
214
 See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown [1991] 765 F Supp 181 at 196, per Sarokin, 
District J. 
215
 See Martin v. Struthers [1943] 319 US 141 at 143, 87 L Ed 1313 at 1317, per Black J. 
216 Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown [1991] 765 F Supp 181at 187, per Sarokin, 
Distr J. 
217
 [1991] 765 F Supp 181. 
218
 [1972] 408 US 92, 33 L Ed 2d 212. 
219 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley [1972] 408 US 92 at 96, 33 L Ed 2d 212 at 217, per 




expressive activity are sharply circumscribed”221. In Grayned v. City of Rockford222 the 
court expressed the view that “the right to use a public place for expressive activity 
may be restricted for weighty reasons”. 
The State may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions that are 
content-neutral223, are required to achieve a compelling State interest and are narrowly 
drawn to serve that end224. For instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that 
the restrictions must be limited to prohibitions of activity which constitutes “actual 
disruptions” for the peaceful and orderly function of the place225. Additionally, State or 
library regulations that are vague or overbroad are regarded as unreasonable. The court 
dismissed in Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown a library policy as 
vague because it stated that any person who stares at or follows another person “with 
the intent to annoy that person” may be excluded from the library. Also, a library 
regulation prohibiting “any behavior which may reasonably result in the disturbance of 
other persons” was considered overbroad because it did not define the term 
“disturbance”226. A vague regulation lacks explicit standards of application and allows 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement227, while an overbroad one inhibits the 
exercise public rights for fear of prosecution228. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents229 the 
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court emphasized that “precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so 
closely touching our most precious freedoms”230.  
On the other hand, the State has the right and the duty to evict disorderly or 
otherwise dangerous persons from the premises. Members of the public have the right 
to access and use the library facilities only as long as their conduct is in accordance 
with the general law and the specific regulations.                   
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CHAPTER 3- LAND OWNED BY STATUTORY CORPORATIONS OPEN 
FOR PUBLIC USE  
The Housing and Development Board, The Civil Aviation Authority, the Land 
Transport Authority and the Jurong Town Corporation are corporations created and 
regulated by statute. They own land which would be regarded as land in private 
ownership. Their employees are public servants for the purpose of the Penal Code231 or 
the Financial Procedure Act232, as is the case with the members and employees of the 
Land Transport Authority. It is also relevant that all these corporations have to furnish 
the respective Minister information about their property and activities233. The 
respective chief executive officer is appointed by234 or with the approval of the 
respective Minister235. Also the budgets of these corporations may be augmented by 
public funds where authorized by the Minister of Finance236. Consequently although 
these statutory corporations although individual legal entities separated from the 
Government, they are also public authorities.   
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3.1  “ Common property” owned by the Housing and Development Board  
The Housing and Development Board237 was created on 1 February 1960 under 
the Ministry of Development by the Housing and Development Ordinance 1959238, and 
it was charged with the task of developing, renting and selling public housing, 
commonly referred to as HDB housing or HDB flats.  
The HDB is a body corporate that has perpetual succession and can sue or be 
sued in its corporate name239. With the approval of the Minister, the HDB can form or 
participate in the formation of any private company having such object as may be 
approved by the Minister240, and can purchase or lease any land required for any 
purpose of the Act241. The House and Development Board, although a statutory 
corporation, is in law a private individual. As such, the land which is leased to the 
HDB by the State is the private property of the HDB. However, it is clear from the 
extent of the government’s involvement in its affairs that the HDB is a public 
authority242. 
The HDB’s main objective243 is the erection of housing for the public. Since it 
took over the housing constructed by the Housing and Urban Development and the 
Jurong Town Corporation in 1982244, the HDB has been the only public housing 
authority in Singapore. 
In the beginning, the HDB flats were built exclusively for rental, but later in 
1964 the Government promoted the Home Ownership Scheme. It was intended to 
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“encourage a property-owning democracy in Singapore, and to enable Singapore 
citizens in the lower middle-income group to own their own homes”245. As a result of 
various schemes, in 2002 93.53 % of the HDB flats were home ownership flats246. 
Residential ownership in HDB housing is purchased by individuals in the form 
of 99 years lease granted by the HDB. In respect to these units every aspect of 
ownership, from the right to possess and to use to the right to transfer inter vivos and 
on death, is subject to restraints and to the consent of the HDB. But subject to these 
limitations the lessee of such unit has the exclusive occupation of his or her unit for the 
duration of 99 years. He controls the access to his flat and he can alienate it albeit only 
with the HDB’s permission. The individual lessee thus has the rights of exclusive 
occupation in respect of his unit. It is thus appropriate to say that he owns the unit. He 
may have restricted rights when compared with owners of private property, but his 
rights are nonetheless ownership rights247. 
However, unlike in the private condominium developments, where the 
common facilities, such as recreational areas or parking lots are the common property 
of all the owners of the flats in the development248, in the case of the HDB buildings 
the common areas belong to the HDB. While the owner of a flat has a registered lease 
of his unit for 99 years and he does not have a share in the common property, he is just 
entitled to use it together with all other flat owners, and indeed with regard to some 
common property with members of the public generally. 
The HDB common property is defined in the Housing and Development Act as 
“ so much of the developed land and all parts of the building as are not comprised in 
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the flats in a building”249. It includes, according to the Town Councils Act250, the 
columns, beams, the external walls and roofs, the lobbies, corridors, stairways and fire 
escapes, all directional signs and signboards, all recreational or community facilities 
and the gardens. The Town Councils Act expressly excludes from the common 
property the bus terminals, the swimming pools and other sports complexes and also 
the public roads and parking places. 
Until 1989 the common property was managed by the HDB itself. The Board 
made rules regulating the use of the common property and contraventions of any of 
these rules are considered offences under the law251. In 1989, when the Town Councils 
Act came into force, the town councils undertook the task of managing the HDB 
housing estates252. A town council is a body corporate responsible for the control, 
maintenance and improvement of the residential and commercial areas in the housing 
estates under its jurisdiction. A town council is a public authority. All members, 
officers and employees of a town council and all employees of its managing agent 
shall be deemed to be public servants for the purposes of the Penal Code (Cap. 224)253. 
Also, for the purposes of enabling a town council to carry out its functions under the 
Town Councils Act, the Minister may from time to time make grants-in-aid to the 
town council of such sums of money and subject to such conditions as the Minister 
may determine out of moneys to be provided by Parliament254.  
The use of common property is regulated by provisions emanating from three 
different sources: the HDB lease, the Housing and Development Act and the Town 
Councils Act and the by-laws made by the town councils. While the terms of an HDB 
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lease apply only to the owners of flats, other regulations from the two sources apply to 
everybody. As such, even if the legislation does not specifically state it, it can be 
implied that all members of the public are entitled to use the common property which 
belongs to the HDB as long as their conduct is within the specific regulations and the 
general law.  
The town councils’ power of management of the “common property” includes 
conservation and landscaping. With the prior written consent of the Board, the town 
councils have the power to establish and maintain places and facilities intended for the 
benefit of the residents of the towns, to improve the common property and to charge 
for the use of any facility or improvement made to the common property255. They are 
empowered to make by-laws for regulating the management, administration, use and 
enjoyment of the common property of the estates for which they are responsible. These 
by-laws must be consistent with the rules made under the Housing and Development 
Act and, in the case of any inconsistency, the by-law shall be void256. The by-laws 
must be published in the Gazette and if the Minister disapproves of them by order 
published in the Gazette they would cease to have effect. 
To reiterate, this “common property” is managed not by its owner, but by a 
separate corporation and both the owner, the HDB, and the managing body, the town 
councils, are controlled and subsidized by the Government. Despite the fact that the 
two statutes do not explicitly assert that all members of the public can use the common 
facilities, this can be easily inferred. In the Town Councils Act the term “any person” 
is frequently used in relation to the use of common property. For example, the statute 
mentions that “any person who commits a breach of any of the by-laws made by a 
Town Council […] and every person who is knowingly a party to the breach or default 
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shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine257. Referring to 
the parking offences, the statutes assert that “any owner” of the vehicle in respect of 
which the offence is committed shall be guilty of an offence under any by-law”258. 
It should also be noted that the breaches of the by-laws made by the town 
councils are offences under the law, punishable by fines259. Therefore, the HDB 
ownership of this “common property” is not only a matter of private property law but 
is also within the domain of public law260. The common areas are the Board’s private 
property but are open to the public at large and its enjoyment and use are not confined 
only to the HDB flat owners. It is clear that this is a special private property; it is a 
private property with a public dimension.    
The Housing and Development (Common property and Open spaces) Rules 
made under the Housing and Development Act stipulate which may be permitted 
behavior and also provides for penalties for those who fail to comply with the Act’s 
provisions. The Town Councils (Use of Common Property) Rules 1997 and the by-
laws adopted by each town council develop and amplify the HDB regulations, thereby 
giving clearer guidelines for the right of access and use. 
Though some of these regulations apply only to the HDB residents, yet most of 
them apply to the conduct of all members of the public who come on its property. For 
instance, the regulations prohibiting the obstruction of rubbish chutes261 or the 
throwing of objects from building and the dangerously positioned objects are referring 
only to the HDB owners or tenants. The other restrictions control the actions of all 
individuals who use and enjoy the “common property”. This is evident from the use of 
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terms such as “no person” or “any person” in the rules. For example, nobody is 
allowed to erect or install any structure, object or material on the common property or 
in any space within a housing estate262, to repair or to paint a vehicle263, to obstruct the 
common property with any object, fixture or thing264. It is also forbidden to plant, 
remove, cut or damage any soil, plant, shrub or tree265. No person is entitled to destroy 
or damage the common property, to draw, divert or take any water from the water 
supply on the common property266. Another instance of this is reflected in the rule 
which provides that, except with the prior permission of the respective town council, 
no one is allowed to display or cause to display any sign267 or to hold or stage any 
show, play, wayang or other entertainment or any reception or formal party in any 
open space without the prior written consent of the town council268. 
It is important to highlight that not all premises comprised in the “common 
property and open spaces” are open to all members of the public generally. Some of 
them are explicitly reserved for private use. For example, without the prior written 
permission of the town council, no person shall enter any lift motor room or any 
common property, being a fenced enclosure, building or room, in which any 
installation for the use or supply of water or electricity may be situated.269 The access 
to these premises is restricted by rule 3 (f), and the public does not enjoy a 
“reasonable” right of access to these places. 
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The offence of unlawful parking or abandoning a vehicle is regulated in 
detail.270 Parking a vehicle on the common property or in any open space within a 
housing estate except in a parking place is a breach of the regulations and the chief 
executive officer or any officer authorized by the Board may remove it to a place of 
safety and detain it there or may prevent the removal of the vehicle without his consent 
by attaching to it an immobilization devise271. A notice will be given to the owner as to 
the procedure by which he may secure the release of his vehicle, usually by paying all 
the expenses incurred and all the charges imposed under the regulation. If the owner 
does not claim his vehicle, the town council on whose territory the vehicle was 
illegally parked or abandoned has the power to sell it272. The same penalty applies to 
the unlawful abandoning of a vehicle. The strict prohibition regarding the obstruction 
of the common property by a vehicle or by a structure or fixture emphasizes the public 
character of the HDB “common property”, a place frequented by many people. At the 
same time, it emphasizes the private aspect of the property, namely the HDB’s power, 
as private landowner, to make rules regulating the use of its property. 
The town councils’ by-laws have to be in accordance with the HDB’ 
regulations and since they all deal with the use of the common property, they are much 
the same both in content and in phraseology. If there are differences, they appear only 
in the details. For example, in Tanjong Pagar and Marine Parade, the use of roller-
skates and skateboards on common property is specifically forbidden if specific areas 
of the common property have been set aside for these activities273.  
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It would appear that members of the public can have access to the common 
property at all time since neither the HDB nor the Town Councils stipulate in their 
regulations a period of time when the public is allowed to entry. This enhances even 
more the HDB common property’s public dimension since, from this point of view, it 
resembles public streets. 
Breaches of HDB regulations or town councils by-laws are offences punishable 
by a fine, usually not exceeding $1000. A person who commits a breach of a HDB 
regulation or a Town Council by-law is only liable to pay the fine. Under the 
regulations and the by-laws there is no power to compel the person to leave the 
premises immediately. It is submitted that although there is no stipulation of such sort 
in any of the HDB or Town Councils regulations, yet where a person’s behaviour is in 
some way offensive, indecent274 or affects the peace and order of the place275, 
authorized officers should have the power to remove that person from the HDB 
common property The HDB’s common property is a public place accessible to all 
members of the public. Consequently, while on the HDB’s common property, the 
public is required to obey also the provisions from other statutes which regulate the 
permitted conduct in public places276. 
The position is clearly demonstrated, “common property” of HDB housing is a 
special type of private property open for the public use and enjoyment. While from the 
ownership perspective it is private property, yet when it comes to the use to which it is 
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put, such common property resembles streets, squares and parks and other types of 
public property. In the case of private property, practically all kinds of conduct is 
permitted as long as it does not amount to a nuisance to owners of adjoining property 
or to the public and as long as the private owner allows it. With regard to common 
property of HDB housing the HDB is in the same position as a public authority. It has 
to decide and act in such manner as to accommodate the needs of all people, or at least 
of the majority of people who use its facilities. The public feature of this “common 
property” is thus emphasized.  
This public dimension works both ways. On one hand, the members of the 
public should behave according with the general law and the specific regulations. On 
the other hand, the HDB cannot unreasonably or capriciously evict persons from the 
places intended and open to the public use. The “common property” in an HDB estate 
is not private property used for the HDB’private purpose and benefit. Although in its 
legal form it is private property, it is designated for the use and enjoyment of the 
general public. It is “quasi-public” property.  
 3.2  Land owned by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore  
For the purpose of this paper, the focus is on the Land Transport Authority277’s 
land used for transport by railway, namely the rapid transit system278, and especially in 
establishing the public nature of the railway premises279.  
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The Land Transport Authority is a body corporate with perpetual succession 
that is capable acquiring, owning, developing or disposing of property, both movable 
and immovable280. This statutory board was established on 1 September 1995 and it 
was formed through the merger of four public sector entities, namely the Registry of 
Vehicles, the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation, the Roads and Transportation Division 
of the Public Works Department and the Land Transport Division of the Ministry of 
Communications281. The LTA’s main function is to plan, to implement and to manage 
the land transport system. It is the function and the duty of the Authority to plan, 
design, construct and manage the roads and the railway in Singapore, in accordance 
with the Land Transport Authority Act282, the Street Works Act283 and the Rapid 
Transit System Act284.  
As from September 1995 all movable and immovable property belonging to the 
Government and managed by the Register of Vehicles, the Mass Rapid Transit 
Corporation, the Roads and Transportation Division of the Public Works Department, 
the Land Transport Division of the Ministry of Communications and also all assets, 
interests, rights and obligations of the Government relating to them were transferred 
and vested in the LTA285. Thus the land dedicated and used for the public 
transportation on railway is the private property of the LTA. 
In 1995 the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation Act which established the Mass 
Rapid Transit Corporation was repealed by the Rapid Transit System Act. Thus as 
from 1 September 1995 the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation ceased to exist and all its 
assets, including the land needed for the operation of the Mass Rapid Transit System, 
                                                
280
 The Land Transport Authority of Singapore Act, Cap. 158A, 1996 Rev. Ed, s.3 (b). 
281
 Ibid at s 32 (1). 
282
 Cap. 158A, 1996 Rev. Ed. 
283
 Cap. 320A, 1996 Rev. Ed. 
284
 Cap. 263A, 1996 Rev. Ed.. 
285
 Ibid at s. 32 (1). 
 53
became the property of the Land Transport Authority286. The present Rapid Transit 
System represents “any one of the railways or part thereof set up or intended to be set 
up” under the Rapid Transit System Act and includes the Mass Rapid Transit system 
set up under the repealed Act287. 
In the Rapid Transit System Act the “railway area” is defined as “that area 
within which land may be acquired or rights in, under or over land may be exercised 
by the Authority pursuant to this Act for the purpose of and incidental to any 
railway”288. In the same Act, the “railway” is defined as a network of horizontal rails, 
tracks grooves or other guide-ways on, under or above the ground along which a train 
moves or runs and includes all tunnels, viaducts, bridges, crossings, depots, stations 
and all other infrastructures constructed or intended to be constructed for any 
railway289. It is thus clear that all land used in connection with the rapid transit system 
is the property of the LTA. By way of contrast, it should be noted that the land used for 
road transportation is State property290. The Land Transport Authority is only 
empowered to construct, improve, manage and maintain the streets and the road related 
facilities. 
Like the HDB, the Land Transport Authority is established by statute and is 
controlled and subsidized by the Government291. It owns land and other assets. 
Although its property, both movable and immovable, does not belong to the State, 
under section 23of the LTA Act, it is the duty of the Authority to furnish the Ministry 
of Transportation information with respect to its property and activities in such manner 
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and at such time as the Minister may require292. It is also explicitly provided that the 
LTA has the power to enter the State land and, subject to the approval of the Collector 
of State Revenue, to construct and operate the railway on it293. It is thus clear that the 
land is vested in the LTA is private and totally separate from the land belonging to the 
State.  
Public transportation by railway is provided by the Singapore Mass Rapid 
Transit Corporation Ltd who on March 31, 1998 signed a Licence and Operating 
Agreement with the LTA valid for 30 years. It owns the Singapore MRT Ltd, the 
operator of the Mass Rapid System, and the Singapore LRT Ltd, the operator of the 
Light Rapid Transit.  
The LTA has the power to make rules regulating the maintenance and 
operation of the railway, the conduct of members of the public using the railway or on 
railway premises and any activity which may damage a railway or may endanger the 
safety of any person traveling on or upon the railway or railway premises294. The 
Authority has also the power to provide that the failure or neglect to comply with its 
regulations shall be an offence punishable by fine not exceeding the sum of $5000 for 
any offence and, in case of a continuing offence, a further sum of $ 100 for every day 
or part thereof during which the offence continues after conviction295.  
The raison d’etre of the LTA is to carry out a public transportation service. 
Therefore it is obvious that the railway premises, although the Authority’s private 
property, are infused with public interest. The LTA does not own and manage the 
railway premises only for its personal interest and advantage but for the benefit and 
convenience of the entire public. As an owner, the Authority is entitled to regulate the 
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people’s conduct while on the railway premises. This it does through the rules found in 
the Rapid Transit System Regulations. 
First it should be mentioned that the “railway premises” can be divided into 
two parts: the paid area and the unpaid area. The paid area means that part of the 
railway premises set aside for the use of fair-paying passengers and provided with 
ticket gates for the purpose of entry and exit296. Some of the rules, like the prescribed 
conduct in the trains297, apply only to the passengers. 
It should also be noted that not all parts of the railway premises are open to the 
public. For example, no one is allowed to enter into or upon any part of the railway 
which is not clearly defined by means of notices, signs and other directional indicators 
provided for persons using the railway premises298. Also it is stated that no authorized 
person shall mount or enter or attempt to mount or enter any train or part thereof, 
except on such part as is provided for the carriage of passenger299. 
Examples of permitted conduct on those parts of the railway premises that are 
open to general public access are given below. 
Access to the “paid area” is possible only by paying the appropriate fare. No 
one is allowed to enter the premises if he is in an intoxicated or drugged state300 or if 
he is in unfit or improper condition to travel by passenger train301. Also, if it is 
expressly prohibited by notice, no person is allowed to smoke302 or to consume any 
foods or drinks303 on the railway premises. Nobody is allowed to consume chewing 
gum304, to bring any animal or other livestock305, to spit or litter306 or to play any 
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musical instrument without authorization from the Authority or its licensee307, namely 
the SMRT Corporation Ltd, on any part of the premises. On the railway premises 
loitering308, hawking, begging or touting309 are prohibited. 
Rule 7 of the Rapid Transit System Regulations310 states that no person shall 
conduct himself on any train or in any part of the railway premises in such a manner as 
to cause a nuisance or annoyance to other passengers311. It is prohibited to meddle with 
the plant or the equipment312, to sit on the stairway or handrail of escalators313, to 
misuse the escalator or the emergency or safety device314. No one is allowed to damage 
the railway property or to cause any obstruction, hindrance or danger to the Authority, 
its licensee or to any person using the railway315. 
These are the rules made by the Authority, as private owner, regulating the 
conduct of members of the public while on the railway premises. Since the words “no 
person”, “any person” or “passengers” are frequently used in the rules, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the railway premises are open to all members of the public.  
The railway premises316 are thus private property open to and used by the 
general public. Additionally, as it is open to the public it would also qualify as a public 
place and so it would be covered by the provisions regulating the conduct of persons 
on a public place under other statutes317.  
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The regulations however seem to confer on the authority an unlimited right to 
decide who can enter on its property: “the Authority and its licensee reserve the right 
to refuse to admit any person onto the railway premises at any time”318. It is also stated 
that any employee of the Authority shall have the power to remove from the railway 
premises any person whom he reasonably suspects of committing any breach of the 
regulations319. From these two rules it seems that the LTA enjoys on one hand an 
unlimited right to decide who can access its property but on the other hand it has only 
a “reasonable” right to evict. 
It is argued that since the railway premises are a special type of private 
property with a public dimension, the principle of “reasonable access” should apply, 
and it should apply to access as well as eviction. Since these premises are open for the 
public use, all members of the public should be allowed the access as long as their 
conduct is according to the law. The Authority and its licensee, the SMRT Corporation 
Ltd, cannot be allowed to unreasonably withdraw its implied invitation to all people to 
come and use its facilities in an arbitrary manner.  
3.3  The Civil Aviation Authority  
Another category of land intended for the use of all members of the public 
consists of the airports belonging to the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore320. 
The CAA was established on the 1 September 1984, when all movable and 
immovable property vested in the Government and used or managed by the 
Department of Civil Aviation and all assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of the 
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Government relating to that Department were transferred to and vested in the 
Authority321, including all movable and immovable property at Changi Airport. 
The CAA is a body corporate with perpetual succession capable of acquiring, 
owning, holding and developing or disposing of property322. Its main functions are to 
maintain and manage the Authority’s aerodrome and to provide such services and 
facilities as are necessary for its operations, to provide air traffic control service and to 
regulate and to promote the development of air transport323. The Authority has also the 
power to provide, acquire or assume the maintenance of any aerodrome in Singapore 
in addition to the aerodrome vested in it under the Civil Aviation Authority Act324. 
As a statutory corporation under the Government’s control and supervision325, 
the CAA is nevertheless legally a private entity. The Authority has its own power of 
decision and as such, it can enter into all contracts for the supply of goods, services or 
materials or for the execution of works or any other contracts necessary for the 
discharge of its functions and duties326. It can also carry out all works or activities as 
may appear to the Authority requisite, advantageous or convenient in order to make the 
best use of the assets of the Authority.327 
The land under the control of the Authority is not State land. As the Civil 
Aviation Authority Act states, the Authority shall furnish the Minister with such 
information or facilities for obtaining information with respect to “ its property” and 
activities as the Minister may from time to time require328. Furthermore, the Act 
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entitles the CAA to utilize “all the property of the Authority, movable and immovable” 
in such a manner as it may think expedient329. It is thus clear that the CAA is a private 
owner and its land is private property.  
Therefore, Changi Airport is a special type of private land, open for public use 
and benefit. Like all private owners the Civil Aviation Authority has the power to 
make regulations for prohibiting or restricting the access to any part of the Authority’s 
aerodrome330. Accordingly, the Authority has indicated that not all its land or premises 
are available for general access. For instance, access to the movement area331 is limited 
only to passengers or to drivers who have an airfield vehicle permit332. Also no person 
is allowed to enter or to remain in the “prohibited areas”333 of the aerodrome334 unless 
he is in possession of an airport pass issued by the chief executive officer.  
As with the land belonging to the Land Transport Authority and used for the 
rapid transit system, the airport premises can be divided into two areas: the area before 
the check-in point or the “unpaid area”, open to all members of the public, and the area 
after the check-in point or the “paid area”, accessible only by the passengers who have 
purchased a valid ticket.  
The Authority is also empowered to regulate the public’s behaviour on its 
property for the purpose of preserving the order within its aerodrome and preventing 
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damage to its property335. In the Civil Aviation Authority Act it is stipulated that any 
person who wilfully removes, destroys or damages the Authority’s property or hinders 
or prevents the property from being used or operated in the manner it is intended to be 
used or operated shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
up to $ 5000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or both336. It is also 
an offence to obstruct or hinder any officer, employee or agent of the Authority acting 
in the discharge of his duty and the person who commits it is liable on conviction to a 
fine not exceeding $2000 or to imprisonment up to 3 months or both337. It is also 
strictly prohibited for any person to leave or deposit any foreign matter or thing on the 
surface of the movement area338, to smoke whilst in any part of the movement area or 
in the hangars339 or to stop or park a vehicle in restricted places in the aerodrome340.  
Since the airport is private land with a public dimension all people who enter it are 
required to obey both the specific regulations adopted by the Authority and the general 
law regulating the conduct in public places341.  
It is clear from the discussion above that in Singapore the public’s rights to 
gain access to the airports owned by statutory corporation are entirely governed by the 
legislation. This is unlike the position in some other common law jurisdictions, namely 
Canada and United Kingdom, where the rights of the public are established by both 
legislation and cases. I shall now briefly outline the approaches taken in these two 
jurisdictions and I shall focus on the reasons behind the courts’ admission of the 
applicability of the principle of reasonable public access to airports. However, it 
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should be mentioned at the onset that in these two jurisdictions the airports are entirely 
State owned.   
Canada
 
The position in Canada is laid down in The Queen in Right of Canada v. 
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada342. The defendants F. Lepine and C. 
Deland were at an airport telling passers-by about the Committee for the 
Commonwealth of Canada and its goals and recruiting members when they were asked 
by a police officer to cease their activities. The airport’s assistant manager informed 
them that such political propaganda activities were not permitted, as ss. 7(a) and 7 (b) 
of the Government Airport Concession Operations Regulations prohibited the 
conducting of any business or undertaking, commercial or otherwise, and any 
advertising or soliciting at an airport, except as authorized in writing by the Minister. 
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that access could not be arbitrarily denied 
in respect of a government-owned airport terminal concourse. The Court regarded the 
State property as “quasi-fiduciary”, held for the benefit and use of all people343. 
The Court regarded these premises as ‘public arena” or “contemporary 
crossroads”, a modern equivalent of the streets and by-ways of the past. It was held 
that few locations offer such a wide “cross-section of the community”344 as the 
airports. Daily the airports draw a great number of people, including passengers and 
friends or relatives who accompany them. The same view had been earlier expressed in 
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the United States in Jamison v. City of St. Louis345 where the court noted, “an airport 
terminal is much like a busy street. Both are lined by shops, restaurants, newsstands 
and other businesses, with travelers or other members of the public coming and going 
as they please.” Taking this into account, the American court concluded that “the 
concourse of a large airport facility…has the character, pattern of activity and nature of 
purpose that make it an appropriate place for the communications of views”346.  
L’Heureux-Dube J identified different parts of the airport that might be more or 
less “public” parts of the property, in much the same way that Laskin CJC identified 
different parts of the shopping centre as more or less “public”347. After admitting that 
airport terminals are freely accessible to all members of the public, she divided them 
into “security zones”, such as Customs, check-in counters, metal detector surveillance 
areas, and luggage inspection, and “non-security zones”, that include lounges, waiting 
areas, restaurants, gift shops, news-stands and the connecting halls and foyers. In the 
security zones, the government can impose regulations regarding who may enter or 
congregate there, in order to ensure the safety and efficiency of the air traffic. The non-
security zones, though, are properly regarded as public arena348, and in their respect the 
government cannot restrict or deny the freedom of reasonable access or expression. 
As Justice McLachlin explained, the protection of civil rights of access and 
communication within these areas was completely linked with the “pursuit of truth, 
participation in the community and the conditions necessary for individual fulfillment 
and human flourishing.”349 It was only through “the encouragement of a tolerant and 
welcoming environment that promotes diversity in forms of self-fulfillment and human 
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flourishing”, that the Court could recognize “the role of expression in maximizing 
human potential and happiness through intellectual and artistic communication”350.  
United Kingdom
 
Much the same view was also earlier taken in England, in Cinnamond v. 
Brittish Airports Authority351. The plaintiffs, six car-hire drivers, after initially setting 
down passengers at Heathrow Airport, made a practice of frequenting parts of the 
airport in order to persuade the incoming passengers to hire them. The British Airports 
Authority, who received many complaints about the fares charged by such drivers, 
wrote on November 23, 1978 to each of the plaintiffs informing them that as from the 
date of the letter and “ until further notice” they were prohibited from entering the 
airport save “ as a bona fide airline passenger”. If in the future they will be found on 
the airport accept as bona fide passengers, the Authority will take action under byelaw 
5(59)352. The plaintiffs claimed that the Authority had no power to ban them from the 
parts of the airport to which the public had access. 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the airport authority had the discretionary 
power to decide what services and facilities it will provide. Nevertheless, the court 
held that once they are provided there is a right in all members of the public to take 
advantage of those services and facilities. As such, the airport authority could not 
refuse entry to a bona fide airline passenger or to those accompanying him, unless the 
circumstances “are such as fairly and reasonably to warrant it”353. Lord Denning MR 
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declared: “They cannot turn him back- at their discretion without rhyme and reason- as 
a private owner can. Nor can they turn back the driver of the car. Nor the friends who 
help him with the luggage. Nor the relatives who come to see him off.”354 However, 
Lord Denning did suggest that there were circumstances such as traffic congestion or 
terrorist attack that might make it “fair and reasonable for the airport to restrict or 
prohibit entry.”355 
Referring to the case at hand, Lord Denning considered that the six taxi drivers, 
although they have a right to enter the airport premises to drop their passengers, have 
no right whatsoever to hang about there to “tout” for a return fare.  By doing so there 
are abusing their rights and, in court’s opinion, that automatically renders them 
trespassers from the very beginning. Furthermore, the taxi drivers abused their rights 
on many occasions, showing no intention to abide by the law in the future. As such, 
the airport authority acted in a reasonable manner when prohibiting them from entering 
on its property.  
It should be noted that for the same reasons, the High Court of Ontario in R v. 
Asatne-Mensah356 upheld the airport’s exclusion of an unlicensed taxi driver on the 
ground that, in those particular circumstances, such exclusion was rational, reasonable 
and proportionate to the problem faced.  
As we can see from the brief discussion of the law in Canada and United 
Kingdom, the courts from these two common law jurisdictions take the view that the 
public enjoys a reasonable right of access to State owned airports and interpret the 
governing regulations in this spirit. There are no cases in respect of the extent of public 
access to the airports in Singapore, which unlike those in Canada and United Kingdom 
are owned by statutory corporations and therefore technically are not State land. But to 
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all intents and purposes they resemble State property. In any event, in deciding 
whether the principle of reasonableness applies to access to airports in Singapore, that 
which should be taken into account is not the technical ownership, but the specific 
character of the place- an airport, a place intended to be used by a large number of 
people everyday, a contemporary crossroad. The public is the reason for the airport’s 
existence, and that is why it should enjoy the benefit of “reasonable” access.  
3.4  Private Parks  
In Singapore beside the national parks, nature reserves and parklands that 
belong to the State there are also private parks owned by the Jurong Town 
Corporation. Like those belonging to the State, these private parks are also open to the 
public. This is stated in the section 3 of the Jurong Town Corporation (Parks) 
Regulations357.     
The Jurong Town Corporation is a body corporate with perpetual succession 
and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the Jurong Town 
Corporation Act358, to acquire, hold or dispose of property, both movable and 
immovable, to enter into contracts and to sue and be sued in its corporate name359. Its 
main functions are to develop and manage sites, parks, estates, townships and other 
premises for industries and businesses in Singapore or elsewhere and to provide 
facilities to enhance the operations of industries and businesses including social 
amenities for the advancement and the well-being of persons living and working in 
such sites, parks, estates and townships or otherwise.  
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So far as the matter of ownership is concerned the parks are owned by the 
Jurong Town Corporation, and so they can be classified as private property. But they 
are not used only for their owner’s enjoyment but for the access and use of the whole 
public. Section 3 of the Jurong Town Corporation (Parks) Regulations clearly so 
indicates. The frequent use of the terms “no person” or “any person” in the Regulations 
supports this. For example, “ no person shall bring or cause to be brought into a park 
any vehicle without the permission of the Manager”360, and also “any person who 
enters into any park or part thereof does so at his own risk”361. 
According to the Jurong Town Corporation (Parks) Regulations these private 
parks include any walk, recreation ground, play ground, lake, open space, traffic island 
and garden maintained by the Manager362. In the meaning of this Act, the Manager is 
the Park and Recreation Agent appointed by the Corporation and includes any 
authorized officer employed by the Agent363. 
Just like in the case of the nature reserves, national parks and parklands that are 
vested in the Government the public can enter and remain in the parks belonging to the 
Corporation only during certain opening hours, appointed in this case by the 
Manager364, and also it can enter and leave the park only through an entrance or exit 
provided for that purpose365.  
The restrictions imposed on the members of the public who use these parks are 
almost similar to those imposed for the use of nature reserves, national parks and 
parklands. There are some additional prohibitions like those preventing the public to 
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bring or to consume in the parks any drugs or any spirituous or intoxicating liquor366, 
to expectorate367 or to preach or deliver any public address or assemble for the purpose 
of holding or taking part in any social entertainment or any religious, political or other 
meeting or demonstration of whatever nature368. The Manager or a duly authorized 
employee of the Corporation may order any person who breaches or is about to breach 
of any of the Regulation to leave the park369. If that person contravenes or fails to 
comply with any of the provisions of the Regulations or if he disobeys an order of the 
Manager to leave he shall, he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on 
conviction to a fine not exceeding $ 500370. These regulations largely similar to those 
governing the access to and the permitted conduct on the national parks, airports, 
public streets or HDB common property may be said to be based on the principle of 
reasonableness. 
However in this context it should be noted that when deciding who can enter in 
the park, the Manager is given an unrestricted power. According to section 3 (4) of the 
Jurong Town Corporation (Parks) Regulations “the Manager may in his discretion 
prohibit the admission of any park or part thereof without assigning any reason”. As 
indicated above these parks belong to the Corporation and as such they are private 
property. But they are also public places, open and indeed frequented by a great 
number of people. They have the same nature and character and perform the same 
functions of recreation for all members of the public as the State owned parks. It is 
argued that the owner, the Jurong Town Corporation, and its agents should not be 
allowed to arbitrarily deny the access to its property, as the Regulations seem to 
indicate.  
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3.5  Summary  
Places such as airports, parks and railway stations are intended to be used by all 
members of the public. Thus, regardless whether they are owned by the State or by 
corporations, statutory or otherwise, they should be governed by the principle of 
reasonable access.  
Although not expressly stated, in Singapore the existence of this principle is 
implied from the legislation. On one hand, as owners these statutory corporations have 
the power to regulate the access to their property. Having made regulations stipulating 
clearly the permitted and forbidden behaviour, the owners should not be allowed to 
capriciously or randomly evict someone who observes them and the general law. On 
the other hand, all individuals who use the property open for public use should conduct 
themselves reasonably. As long as their conduct is according to the rules imposed by 
the general and the specific regulations, they should be allowed to enter and remain on 
the land belonging to statutory corporations and should not face arbitrary eviction. 
Should any dispute arise regarding the extent of public access to such property it is to 
be hoped that the courts will have in mind the use to which such property is put rather 
then the technical nature of the ownership. It is my view that the principle of 
reasonableness should apply to the exercise of ownership rights in the light of the 
dedication of such land to public use.     
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CHAPTER 4--PROPERTY OWNED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OPEN  
FOR PUBLIC USE  
4.1  Private land intended for general use by the public 
This category of private property differs from the one we have just discussed 
above because the owner in this case is truly private. In the former category the owner 
is subsidized and controlled by the State and its employees are public servants371. In 
the situation discussed here, the land is owned by private individuals and not by 
statutory corporations which are likened to public authorities. The owner is in the same 
position as and has powers similar to those of the owner of a private house. The 
difference comes only from the use to which the land is put. As far as I am aware, in 
Singapore there are no statutes or Court decisions regulating this matter. We shall look 
therefore at the provisions in some common law jurisdictions, namely Australia, 
Canada, United Kingdom and United States. The approach taken in these common law 
decisions could provide some guidance for the Singaporean Courts.  
4.1.1  Shopping malls  
One of the modern private places that have an essential public character is the 
shopping mall. It has been said of the shopping mall that “the access by the public is 
the very reason for its existence”372, and not only for the purpose of consumer 
purchase, because the modern shopping mall performs a mixture of functions of which 
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buying and selling of goods represent only one feature373. In New Jersey Coalition 
Against War in the Middle East v. JMB Realty Corporation 374Wilentz C.J remarked 
that” the public’s invitation to use the property …is broad…For the ordinary citizen it 
is not just an invitation to shop, but to do whatever one would do downtown, including 
doing very little of anything…”375.  
The shopping malls also provide a recreational space due to the generous 
provision of seating, indoor plants, fountains and cafés. From this point of view the 
shopping malls can be considered the “equivalent, in an enclosed format, of a public 
park”376. The shopping malls also provide display areas for entertainers and public 
exhibitions. 
 It can be said that much of the public social life is conducted on these privately 
owned premises. Although the ultimate purpose of these shopping centers is 
commercial, “ their normal use is all-embracing, almost without limit, projecting a 
community image, serving as their own communities, encompassing practically all 
aspects of a downtown business district, including expensive uses and community 
events”377. They are even considered as “the functional equivalent of the city streets, 
squares and parks of earlier days”378. As such, apart from people whose primary 
purpose is to buy or to conduct businesses, in shopping malls, almost daily, people 
come to socialize, to talk and relax over a cup of coffee, or simply to ‘hang’ around. 
Members of different social classes can be encountered in shopping malls, each of 
them pursuing their own interest: from rich customers to the unemployed and 
disadvantaged members of society. 
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The question here is whether any of these members of general public can be 
arbitrarily evicted from these “quasi-public” spaces. If we take into account the 
commercial interest of the shopping mall’s owner, the rich, powerful customers are 
unlikely to be excluded. But what about the unemployed people or the large groups of 
noisy teenagers? Their presence might not be entirely welcome to those who own these 
premises, but can they be excluded without good reason? It would seem unjust that 
someone could be removed, sometimes permanently, from these places in a selective 
and unreasonable manner. Some of the modern shopping plazas are of considerable 
size379, accordingly exclusion from these places will mean that important parts of the 
central city areas will be restricted for some members of the society. 
In the recent years, some common law jurisdictions began to realize that the 
powers of arbitrary exclusion are no longer inevitable or necessary incident of property 
in these privately held places with an essentially public character.380 It is also true that 
there are still there jurisdictions which remain more conservative. In these jurisdictions 
the judges find it hard to depart from the traditional point of view that if the property is 
privately owned, no matter the use to which it is put, trespass is as appropriate in one 
case (e.g. private household) as in the other (e.g. shopping malls).  
A good example of the conservative view is the English decision in CIN 
Properties Ltd v. Rawlins381. In 1991, CIN Properties banned a group of black youths 
for lifetime from entering the Center “for any reason whatsoever” and indicated that 
injunction proceedings would follow. When CIN Properties’ injunction application 
was brought in front of Birmingham County Court, in 1993, Mr. Recorder Philip Cox, 
QC ruled that the implied invitation to the defendant youth, as to all members of the 
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public, to enter the Swansgate Center could not be subjectively withdrawn. It was held 
that the members of the public, subject only to a requirement of “reasonable conduct” 
had an “equitable” or “irrevocable” right to enter and use the shopping mall during its 
normal business hours. 
The Court of Appeal unanimously reversed this ruling in 1995. The Court 
effectively endorsed CIN Properties’ absolute exclusion of persons against whom no 
charge of misconduct, or other rational ground for eviction, has ever been made out. 
This decision was the subject of an application to the European Commission of Human 
Rights, but the application was declared inadmissible by the Commission, largely 
because the United Kingdom had never ratified Protocol No.4, Article 2 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, that guarantees the right to liberty of 
movement. 
The effect of this decision was that a group of young men was permanently 
exiled from the center of their hometown, thereby possibly endangering their 
livelihood and weakening their freedom to engage in the social and commercial 
relationships of their choice. In such circumstances, it is questioned as to whether the 
private owner should be allowed to restrict public access to the social, commercial and 
recreational utilities that nowadays characterize areas of “mass private property.” 
The surprising conservative and traditional approach of the English Court of 
Appeal in CIN Properties contrasts with the legal position now adopted in a growing 
number of common law jurisdictions, namely that both entry and exclusion from 
privately owned property dedicated to public use, quasi-public premises, must be 
governed by an overarching doctrine of reasonableness. The common law’s 
conventional rule of arbitrary exclusion has started to give away to a rather different 
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rule under which the private owner of these quasi-public spaces may exclude members 
of the public only on objectively reasonable grounds. 
The beginning of this shift is often considered to have been Chief Justice 
Laskin’s famous dissent in Harrison v. Carswell382. He argued that the common-law 
could not remain “so devoid of reason” as to tolerate the “whimsy” of entirely arbitrary 
exclusion from such “quasi-public” locations as the shopping malls383. Since a 
shopping center is freely accessible to public, the private owner has invested members 
of the public with the right of entry during the business hours of his tenants and with a 
right to remain there subject to lawful behaviour. This is the reason why in Chief 
Justice Laskin’s view it could not make sense that “an ancient legal concept, trespass, 
[should be] urged… in all its pristine force by a shopping center owner in respect of 
areas which have been opened by him to public use”384. For him the case at hand 
“involves a search for an appropriate legal framework for new social facts which show 
up the inaptness of an old doctrine developed upon a completely different social 
foundation”385. Therefore the transformations that take place in social, economic and 
political life necessarily call for the adaptation of the doctrine of trespass. 
Thus, it is argued that the doctrine of trespass cannot be applied to shopping 
malls in the same way it is applied to a private household. The element of protection of 
privacy that underlies the concept of trespass to private dwelling places, simply does 
not find its place in respect to trespass to public areas of a shopping center. In the latter 
case there is no challenge to the owner’s title or to his privacy when members of the 
public use those facilities. 
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When referring to “public areas”, in his reasoning Laskin CJC identified 
different parts of a shopping center, concluding that some parts were more “public” 
than “private”. The usual amenities, such as access roads, parking lots and sidewalks, 
are opened to public use, “and necessarily so because of the commercial character of 
the enterprise based on tenancies by operators of a variety of 
business”386.Consequently, they are closer in character to public road and sidewalks 
than to a private household. 
At the end of his reasoning Laskin CJC stressed on the requirement of a 
“reasonable conduct” that the members of the public should carry out. Even if 
unrestricted access is given to certain areas of shopping mall, it does not follow that 
the public can engage in any sort of activity or conduct; the privileged user of public 
areas is “revocable upon misbehaviour…or by reason of unlawful activity.”387   
Chief Justice Laskin’s strong dissent in Harrisson v. Carswell was echoed in 
different decisions throughout the United States. For example, in PruneYard Shopping 
Center v. Robins388 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the California 
Constitution protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in privately owned 
shopping centres and rejected the claim of a shopping center owner that recognition of 
this right violated his “right to exclude others”, a fundamental component of federally 
protected property rights. When delivering his reasons, Rehnquist J emphasised: “The 
shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use of the 
appellants [the private owner of the shopping mall]. It is instead a business 
establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please.”389 Because the 
shopping centre has been opened to the public, it lost its private character, and thereby 
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the members of the public can exercises the same free speech rights, as they would 
have on similar public facilities or the streets of a city or town390. 
Later cases upheld claims of reasonable public access to privately owned 
shopping centers for purposes that extend beyond commercial activity to encompass 
the peaceful communication of a range of personal and political concerns.  The 
Supreme Court of North Dakota ruled in City of Jamestown v. Beneda391 that the 
“common walkways and public areas of the modern-day mall…lend themselves to 
expressive activity of the public”392. The shopping malls are intended to accommodate 
large numbers of persons at one time. Accordingly, “the ability …to communicate 
ideas would be greatly reduced if access to such centers were denied.”393 
The permitted forms of communication may include “non-disruptive speech” 
such as that comprised in the wearing of a T-shirt or button that contains a political 
message394, and may also involve a display of a particular lifestyle, cultural or political 
affiliation395. 
As we have seen, even though the case law from common-law jurisdictions is 
far from unanimous on this point, the preponderant view is that the large shopping 
malls or retail commercial areas come within the rule of ‘reasonable public access” 
rule. The common parts of these premises represent private property” affected with a 
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public interest”, precisely because, in the words of Chief Justice Waite in Munn v. 
Illinois396, they “stand…in the very gateway of commerce”397. 
In Singapore there are many privately owned shopping malls such as 
Centrepoint, Paragon or Wisma Atria. Although there are no statutory provisions or 
Court decisions recognizing the public right of reasonable access, it is argued that the 
law here should adopt the non traditional position according to which the public should 
enjoy reasonable access to the shopping mall’s common areas open for public use. 
In the same way that the reasonable access is recognized in respect of the HDB 
or LTA property open for public, the same reasonable access right should be 
recognized in respect of shopping malls. Although the HDB or the LTA are public 
authorities, legally they are private entities. The raison d’etre of the reasonable public 
access is not a matter of ownership but the public use to which the land is dedicated. 
As long as the land is open for the public and it is indeed regularly frequented by large 
numbers of persons, the owner should not be allowed to behave in an arbitrary manner.  
4.2  Private land intended for particular uses by members of the public  
It is also my submission that private hospitals, hotels and casinos, libraries, 
racecourse tracks and universities form another category of “quasi-public” spaces from 
which members of the general public cannot be arbitrarily evicted. 
These properties are impliedly open for the public’s use and benefit, but only 
for strictly defined purpose. It may be said that these places have a less “public” 
character than the shopping malls, because the public’ reasonable interests are 
circumscribed by the place’s character or nature. For example, while in a shopping 
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mall the public’s range of pursuits is extremely wide, including commercial 
transaction, relaxing at a café or lawful picketing, in a private hospital the only 
reasonable pursuit is to seek medical assistance or to visit a sick relative or friend. 
However, as long as people are there for these purposes the hospital’s management has 
no right to arbitrarily force them to leave398.  
4.2.1   Private universities  
The fundamental purpose of university as an institution of higher learning is to 
educate people, to stimulate creative thinking and “to increase the wealth of human 
knowledge”399 through discourse and discussion, free and open debate and also 
through a free exchange of ideas. To achieve these goals universities, whether public 
or private400, have to open their premises to all members of the public and to expose 
their students and faculty members to “a wide variety of views on controversial 
questions”401.    
The degree of protection that public rights of free access, speech and belief 
receive on private university campus is discussed in State v. Schmid402. On April 5, 
1978 while distributing and selling political literature on the campus of Princeton 
University, defendant Chris Schmid, a member of the United States Labor Party, was 
arrested and charged by the university with trespass upon private property. The 
defendant argued that the university violated his rights of free speech and assembly. 
                                                
398
 This view will be discussed more fully bellow at pp. 92-95. 
399
 See New Jersey Coalition Against war in the Middle East v. JMB Realty Corporation [1994] 650 
A2d 757 at 791, per Garibaldi J. 
400
 Justice Handler stated in State v. Schmid [1980] 423 A2d 615 at p. 621 : “Given the importance 
attached to higher education and the significant social contributions of private educational institutions, a 
wide disparity between the nature and scope of permitted speech at private universities and that which 
must be allowed at public universities would seem anomalous and undesirable”. 
401
 See William G. Bowen, ‘The role of the University as an Institution in Confronting External Issues ( 
January 6, 1978) cited by Handler J in State v. Schmid [1980] 423 A2d 615 at 631. 
402
 [1980] 423 A2d 615. 
 78
In its decision the Supreme Court laid down a “test” that in its opinion should 
be applied when ascertaining whether in a given case the private owner may be 
required to allow on his property the public reasonable exercise of the constitutional 
freedoms of speech and assembly403. The test takes into account 1) the nature, purposes 
and primary use of such private property, generally, its “normal use”, 2) the extent and 
nature of the public’s invitation to use that property and 3) the purpose of the 
expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and 
public use of the property. 
Applying the test to the case at hand, the Court had first to determine the 
Princeton University’s “primary use”. The answer was given by the University 
Regulations which clearly stated ”the central purposes of a University are the pursuit 
of truth, the discovery of new knowledge through scholarship and research…the 
transmission of knowledge and learning to society at large”404. The next step was to 
find out the extent and nature of a public invitation to use the university’s property. For 
the court it was clear that only through a “policy of openness and freedom with respect 
to the use of its facilities” could the university “encourage both a wide and continuous 
exchange of opinions and ideas”405. Princeton University made its campus available by 
both the Princeton community and the general public, because it recognized that this 
type of public debate lies at the very heart of its intellectual academic life. The last step 
taken by the court was to determine whether the expressional activities undertaken by 
members of the public are in any way incompatible with both the private and public 
use of the campus and facilities of the university. The court took into account that 
although the invitation to the public is broad, it is not truly “ open-ended” or for “any 
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and all purposes”406 and that there should be a connection between the purpose of the 
university’s dedication to public use and the purpose of the expressional activities. 
As there were no indications that the defendant’s activities “disrupted the 
regular and essential operations of the university”, or “significantly infringed on the 
rights of others”, or caused any interference with the normal use of the university 
property and the normal routine of the college community, the Supreme Court decided 
that the university was at fault for having rejected a defendant whose actions had been 
“noninjurious and reasonable”407. It held that Princeton University violated the 
defendant’s state constitutional rights by evicting him from the university premises and 
by securing his arrest for distributing political literature on its campus. 
The Supreme Court also expressed the view that “in particular settings, private 
entities, including educational institutions, may so impact upon the public…as to be 
engaged functionally in “state action”408. It held that Princeton University committed 
its facilities and property to a public use and by doing so, it “has assumed a public 
function”409 and a constitutional obligation not to abridge the individual freedoms. In 
Justice Handler’s opinion ”the more private property is devoted to public use, the more 
it must accommodate the rights which inhere in individual members of the general 
public who use that property.”410    
It should also be noted that although the university dedicated its property to 
public use, it nevertheless retained its private character. The Supreme Court admitted 
that the owner of private property is “entitled to fashion reasonable rules to control the 
mode, opportunity and site for the individual exercise of expressional rights upon his 
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property”411. As a private educational institution, it has a fundamental responsibility to 
assure the academic and general well being of its students, teachers and related 
personnel and that justify the strict control imposed by the university of those who 
seek to enter its domain. In the court’s view reasonable regulations must contain 
definite standards governing the actual exercise of expressional freedoms. They should 
specify the requirements for granting or withholding an authorization and also the 
permitted time, place or manner for individuals to exercise their rights of speech and 
assembly. In the case at hand, the court held that the university’s regulations were 
“devoid of reasonable standards” intended to protect both the legitimate interests of the 
university as an institution of higher education and the individual exercise of 
expressional freedom. 
 In State v. Schmid, the Supreme Court approached the issue from the 
perspective of the balancing of the constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly 
with the property rights. Weighing the university’s interest in controlling its property 
against plaintiff’s interest in access to that property in order to express his political 
views, the Court clearly refused to protect unreasonable exclusions. The Court 
considered that the harm to the defendant’s expressive rights outweighed the value of 
the university’s property rights. 
In Singapore there are three privately owned universities, namely the National 
University of Singapore412, the Nanyang Technological University413 and the 
Singapore Management University414. 
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National University of Singapore
 
According to section 3 (1) of the National University of Singapore Act, the 
University415, which incorporates the University of Singapore and the Nanyang 
University, is a body corporate with perpetual succession, being capable of acquiring, 
owing, holding, developing or disposing of both movable and immovable property416. 
Its main objectives are to provide in Singapore educational facilities at university 
standards417, to advance and disseminate knowledge and to promote research and 
scholarship418. 
The land belonging to the NUS is held in private property. As from 8th August 
1980 all property, movable and immovable, and all rights and interests that before that 
date were vested or held in trust for the University of Singapore or the Nanyang 
University was vested or held in trust for the NUS419. According to section 13 (1) the 
President of Singapore may by order grant to the University any State land for the 
purposes of the University, subject to such restrictions, conditions or prohibitions as 
may be specified in the order420. It can thus be inferred from the provisions of the Act 
that the land belonging to the NUS is totally separated from the land belonging to the 
State. 
As a private owner, the University has the power to make statutes and 
regulations as may be necessary for the administration of its affairs or for carrying out 
its functions421. Although the Act does not explicitly state it, it is argued that the 
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University is allowed to adopt rules regulating the public access to its property. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, the University Council has not made yet any 
such rules. 
Although it is an individual legal entity separated from the Government, the 
National University of Singapore is a public authority. Its public character is supported 
by various provisions of the Act. For example, the University is subsidized by the 
Government, receiving grants-in-aid from the Minister of Finance422. Additionally, the 
University has to submit to the Minister its accounts and financial statements that have 
been audited and also an annual report of its activities423. The Minister shall as soon as 
practicable present such report to Parliament. Also, according to section 3(1) of the 
Constitution of the University, the President of the Republic of Singapore shall be 
Chancellor of the University and the President of the University Senate.  
Nanyang Technological University
 
According to section 3 (1) of the Nanyang Technological University Act, the 
University424 is a body corporate with perpetual succession, being capable of suing and 
being sued and of acquiring, owning, holding or disposing of property, both movable 
and immovable425. The NTU replaced the Nanyang Technological Institute established 
by the repealed Nanyang Technological Institute Act426. 
From the provisions of the Nanyang Technological University Act it is clear 
that the land belonging to the Nanyang University is held in private property. For 
instance, section 2 of the Second Schedule states that as from 1st July 1991 all 
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property, movable and immovable, and all the rights and interests which before that 
date were vested or held in trust for the Institute shall be vested or held in trust by the 
NTU. It is also provided that that the President of Singapore may grant to the NTU any 
State land for the purpose of the University subject to such restrictions or prohibitions 
relating to the use, occupation or disposition of the land as may be specified in the 
order427. It can thus be inferred that the land belonging to the NTU is held in private 
ownership, totally separated from State land.  
Like the National University of Singapore, the NTU has the power to make 
statutes and regulations as may be necessary for the administration of its affairs or for 
carrying out its functions428. The statutes have to be published in Gazette, within one 
month after they are made, and may be published in such newspapers as the Council of 
the University approves429. It is submitted that, although not expressly stated in the 
Act, the NTU can make rules regulating public access to its land. However, to the best 
of my knowledge, the University has not made yet such rules. 
Although it is a separate legal entity, the NTU is a public authority. Its public 
character is supported by many provisions of the Act. For example, the University is 
subsidized by the Government, receiving grants-in-aid from the Minister of Finance430. 
Also, the University has to submit to the Minister a copy of its accounts, financial 
statements and report of activities431, and the Minister, as soon as practicable, has to 
present a copy of the above to the Parliament432. Additionally, according to section 3 
(1) of the Constitution of the University, the President of the Republic of Singapore is 
the Chancellor of the University and the President of the University Senate. 
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Unlike the two universities discussed above, the Singapore Management 
University433 is a private company registered under the Company Act434 on 12th 
January 2000435. 
Although a private legal entity, the SMU is nevertheless public authority, 
controlled by the Government. For instance, members of the University Board are 
appointed or replaced by the Minister436. Also, the University needs the Minister’s 
consent when admitting any person as member of the university437 or when disposing 
of the whole or substantially the whole of its undertaking or property438.  
From the discussion above it is clear that the three universities dedicate their 
land for public use. Since they assume public functions and open their land to all 
members of the public it is argued that the principle of reasonable access should apply 
in respect of public access to universities’ land. All members of the public who enter 
the universities’ property should behave in a reasonable manner and in accordance 
with the intended user of the property. They should also abide by the general law and 
any specific regulations that the universities may make. On their part, the universities 
are required to act in a reasonable manner when denying access to or evicting 
individuals from its property.  
Although the legislation does not deal with the public access to the universities’ 
land, it is argued that the principle of reasonable access should apply in this case in 
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much the same way it should apply in respect of other statutory corporations, such as 
the HDB or LTA. However, because the universities open their land for a more limited 
user, it is argued that a stricter control of public access is justifiable.   
4.2.2  Private hotels and casinos  
Even without referring to constitutional protection of rights, some American 
courts have reached similar conclusions, although in the different context of private 
hotels and casinos.  
In Uston v. Resorts International Hotel Inc439 the defendant Resorts 
International Hotel excluded on January 30, 1979 the plaintiff, Kenneth Uston, from 
the blackjack table because his strategy increased his chances of winning money. The 
plaintiff contended that, although his strategy of card counting favoured him under the 
current blackjack rules made by the Casino Control Commission, nevertheless the 
Resorts had no common law or statutory right to exclude him for that reason. The 
defendant argued that, as a private owner, it enjoys a common law right to evict 
anyone it chooses, as long as the exclusion does not violate State or federal civil rights 
laws. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the common law itself no longer 
entitles the owner of quasi-public premises capriciously “to exclude anyone at all for 
any reason.”440The court confirmed in the case at hand that control of admission to 
such premises as a casino nowadays is “substantially limited by a competing common 
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law right of reasonable access to public places”441. Justice Pashman held that: “when 
property owners open their premises to the general public in the pursuit of their own 
property interest, they have no right to exclude people unreasonably. On the contrary, 
they have a duty not to act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner towards persons 
who come on their premises.”442. Therefore, as long as the respondent Uston did not 
threaten the security of any of the casino user and he did not disrupt the “ regular and 
essential” functioning of the casino operations, he possesses “a usual right of 
reasonable access” to Resorts International’s gambling tables. 
In Uston v. Resorts International Hotel Inc. the Supreme Court decided that as 
long as the owner of a quasi-public space benefits from the public’s attendance of its 
premises his power of exclusion is limited, and he can evict members of the general 
public only for a reasonable cause.  
In Singapore there are many privately owned hotels, like Marina Mandarin, Pan 
Pacific or Ritz- Carlton, but there are no casinos. According to the Hotels Act443 no 
premises shall be used as private hotels unless they are registered by the Hotels 
Licensing Board444. Although the legislation does not discuss the public access to the 
hotels’ premises, it is submitted that the principle of reasonable access applies. The 
hotels are properties open and dedicated for public use. At common law, as innkeepers, 
hotels have a duty to act in a reasonable manner towards all members of the public445.   
                                                
441
 Ibid at 372, per Pashman, J. See also Hoagburg v. Harrah’s Marina Hotel Casino [1984] 585 F Supp 
1167 at 1173, per Cohen, SDJ, where it is noted that in Uston v. Resorts International Hotel Inc the 
Court reverted to the recognition of the “common law right of reasonable access”. 
442
 Ibid at 375, per Pashman, J. See also Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement association [1984] 471 
A2d 355 at 366, per Schreiber, J where it was held that “Where an organization is quasi-public, its 
power to exclude must be reasonably and lawfully exercised in furtherance of the public welfare related 
to its public characteristics”. 
443
 Cap. 127, 1999 Rev. Ed. 
444
 Ibid at s. 5 (1). 
445
 See discussion above at Chapter 1, p. 12. 
 87
4.2.3  Private racecourses  
It is submitted that another category of quasi-public land consists of privately 
held racecourses. Although the subject of private ownership they are intended and 
open for public use. The racecourses are frequented by many people, each with his 
own motivation. Some people come simply to watch the races, to relax and have fun, 
while others come to bet and make money. It is obvious that the public use of the 
racecourses is a condition for their existence. The question therefore arises if their 
private owner could be allowed to arbitrarily evict individuals from his property. 
I shall now discuss the different responses that two common-law jurisdictions, 
Australia and Canada, gave to this question. The Australian view is that the owner of a 
private racecourse is required to behave in a reasonable manner when denying access 
to or evicting someone from its property, as the racecourse is quasi-public in nature. 
One the other hand, in Canada the judges are reluctant to depart from the traditional 
approach and to restrict the absolute power of private owners to decide who can enter 
or remain on their land. 
The Australian view was expressed in Forbes v. New South Wales Trotting 
Club Ltd446.  On 15th January 1976, the plaintiff Douglas Mervyn Forbes, who for 
many years attended races at two courses owned by the New South Wales Trotting 
Club Ltd, was excluded by the committee of the club from both courses it owned and 
from “ any other course which may now or in the future be occupied by or come under 
the control” of the club. The committee acted in accordance with rule 28 of Rules of 
Trotting, adopted and amended by the Australian Trotting Council, which empowered 
the committee of any club at any time to warn any person off any course it controlled. 
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The plaintiff, who derived an income from betting at trotting courses, alleged that his 
betting activities had been prejudiced by his exclusion from the courses. He sued the 
Club in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking an 
injunction and a declaration that the resolution through which he had been excluded 
was void on the ground that he had not been afforded an opportunity to be heard before 
the resolution was passed. 
The court held that members of the public had a right of reasonable access to 
private racecourse tracks, one of the reasons being the benefits that the owner of such 
place derives from the public attendance. Gibbs J. ruled that an owner who uses his 
land to conduct public race meeting “owes a moral duty to the public from whose 
attendance he benefits […] that he should not defeat the reasonable expectation of an 
individual […] by excluding him quite arbitrarily and capriciously”447. 
Another reason why the owner of such a quasi-public place cannot restrict the 
public’s free access to his property is that hosting races is a public activity that affects 
a large number of people, ”ten of thousands of whom go to watch the spectacles, many 
to bet as a hobby and some […] to try to make a living by betting”448. As a result, the 
owner’s rights are similar to those of a public authority. As such, the owners they must 
exercise their rights “bona fide” and with due regard to the persons using the facilities.   
The Supreme Court of New South Wales also held that since the New South 
Wales Trotting Club’s activity was regulated by a government statute, namely Rules of 
Trotting, it could not arbitrarily evict members of the general public. According to the 
Rules of Trotting, the stewards have the power of exclusion or removal from a 
racecourse track and they may exercise this power only on specific grounds. The 
stewards, acting honestly and reasonably, can evict only those persons whose presence 
                                                
447
 Ibid at 269, per Gibbs, J. 
448
 Ibid at 274, per Murphy J. 
 89
is deemed undesirable, because they are “drunk, disorderly or otherwise unfitted by 
their condition or behaviour to be admitted”449.  
The owner of a racecourse track exercises a public power, and as such, he 
cannot arbitrarily remove a reasonable user during a race meeting. The functions that 
he performs when conducting a race meeting are qualitatively different from those 
performed by an ordinary householder exercising his private property rights450. 
However, it is very important to note that this public power is carried out only at the 
race time, because only then the land is used in this public way. At all other times the 
land reverts to its private use and the owner’s ordinary private rights, including the 
absolute right to exclude others, are exercised451.  
The Canadian courts on the other hand do not differentiate between the 
personal and public use of private land. In their opinion the private owner’s right to 
exclude persons is absolute452. In Russo v. Ontario Jockey Club453 Justice Boland 
pointed out that the Canadian common and statute law preserves the landowner’s right 
to exclude persons from his property without the prerequisite of a reasonable ground 
for such action. In the court’s opinion “this principle seems to apply equally to the 
owner of a house as to the owner of a “public area”, such as an exhibition, a shopping 
mall or a race-track”454. 
It is relevant to note that Justice Boland observed that “ from a review of the 
trespass case-law in Canada, the United States and Australia, only Canada has not yet 
recognized that the broad right of landowners to exclude persons is inappropriate when 
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the land is open to all the public”455. The reason is to be found in the reluctance of 
Canadian courts to change the existing law. In their opinion such important change 
should be made by the “Legislature, which is representative of the people and designed 
to manifest the political will”456. Recognizing a public free access right to private land 
open for public use would be in derogation of the common law right allowing the 
private owner to exclude from its premises such persons as he sees fit. Such derogation 
from the common law right “can only be accomplished by a legislative enactment or 
by a rule or regulation having legislative effect”457. 
In Singapore there is one private racecourse owned by the Singapore Turf Club, 
a private society registered under the Societies Act458. Although held in private 
ownership459,as from 9th November 1987 the club’s immovable property is held by the 
club on trust for the Singapore Totalisator Board’s purposes460. The Board is a 
statutory corporation established by the Singapore Totalisator Board Act461 having as 
main functions to operate totalisators462 according to the approved scheme under 
section 11 of the Singapore Totalisator Board Act463 and to maintain and improve turf 
clubs464. 
The public access to private racecourses is provided for in detail in the 
Singapore Totalisator Board Act. Section 14 (1) states that “ a turf club may admit 
members of the public to any race course or premises under the control or supervision 
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of the club or of any one or more of the officers of such club on payment of an 
admission fee”. Since the Act uses the term “members of the public”, it can be inferred 
that the right of access to racecourses is recognized for all members of the public. 
Nevertheless, the club has the power to make from time to time by-laws regulating the 
public access to its premises, but only with the Minister’s approval465. Under section 
14 (4), the by-laws made by the club can provide for the exclusion of any specified 
class or description of persons either absolutely or subject to the prescribed conditions. 
Furthermore, the provisions of section 14 (4) are not deemed to restrict the club’s 
powers to remove any person from the racecourses it occupies. For example, if 
members of the public commit a breach of the by-laws made by the club, they can be 
removed from the racecourse by any member, officer, agent or employee of the club or 
by any police officer466.  
From the provisions of the Act it would seem that the Singapore Turf Club has 
extensive exclusory powers and that it can evict members of the public in an arbitrary 
manner, without a requirement of reasonableness. However, it should be emphasized 
that all the by-laws made by the Club require the Minister’s approval and the Minister 
is expected to allow only those by-laws that provide for the exclusion of unreasonable 
users.  
It is clear from the discussion above that although a private legal entity, the 
Turf Club is effectively a public authority. It is argued that, even though the right of 
reasonable public access to private racecourses is not expressly stated by the 
legislation, it is nevertheless implicitly recognized.   
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 4.2.4  Private hospitals  
Private hospitals, like private universities, racecourses, hotels and casinos, are 
quasi-public spaces because although privately owned, they are opened for the general 
public’s use and benefit. 
Although they may receive substantial financial support from government or 
local authorities and are also the beneficiaries of tax exemptions, they still preserve 
their private nature467. Unlike other private properties that are opened only for limited 
use and restricted categories of persons, private hospitals are intended to cater to the 
medical needs of a whole community. They, as quasi-public institutions, do not only 
operate for private ends but also for the benefit of the public and, as such, they have an 
obligation towards the general public to make their medical services available and to 
serve all individuals without discrimination. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey followed this view in Doe v. Bridgeton 
Hospital Association Inc468. The plaintiffs, Jane Doe and Mary Roe together with their 
doctors filed action to compel three private hospitals to make their facilities available 
to the plaintiffs and their physicians for elective abortion procedure during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. The plaintiffs were denied abortions at these hospitals because 
their board of trustees adopted policies permitting only therapeutic abortions on their 
premises. 
The private hospitals contended that since they are private, non-profit hospitals, 
their governing board of trustees has an absolute right to determine who should use 
their facilities and for what specific purpose. The Court rejected this contention and 
held that although the board of trustees is vested with managerial discretion within the 
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frame of hospital’s functions and purposes, it could not establish rules prohibiting the 
public’s access or use of the hospital’s facilities. Because they are not related to the 
hospital’s functions and operational needs, these regulations are unreasonable, 
arbitrarily and they completely disregard the public interest and the common good.  
As Justice Schreiber noted, some private businesses are the subject of judicial 
regulation for the common good because they are quasi-public, and as such, those 
entrusted with their operation act as trustees for the public. Their managerial powers 
are deeply embedded in public aspects and their powers have to be exercised 
reasonably and for the public good. In the case at hand, the court held that Bridgeton 
Hospital, “a non-sectarian, non-profit hospital” that opened its facilities to the general 
public, assumed quasi-public obligations akin to those assumed by common carriers 
and innkeepers. In court’s opinion, every time a private owner “takes upon himself a 
public trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellows”469 he is bound to open its facilities 
for all members of the general public. If he fails to do so and his actions are proved to 
be unreasonable, then he will be “under the pain of an action against him”470.  
But even if he is required to permit the public access, it does not necessarily 
mean that he is required to allow or to cater to all of the public’s needs. He is bound 
only to make sure that every person will be attended “in all the things that are within 
the reach and comprehension”471 of his business. Thus, the public enjoys only a 
reasonable and not an unlimited right of access to quasi-property. The activities that 
the people pursue while on these particular premises have to be circumscribed by the 
specific functions performed by the quasi-public institution. 
Hospitals are institutions organized to serve the public by operating medical 
facilities. Only to this extent do the private hospitals have a public aspect and the 
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consequent responsibilities. Only to this extent does the board of trustees have to adopt 
reasonable policies concerning the public’s right of access. For example, the hospital’s 
board of trustees cannot refuse access to nor can they evict without a strong, 
compelling reason, sick persons looking for medical treatment or for persons 
accompanying or visiting them, whether they are relatives, friends or taxi drivers.  
In this case, the body of trustees was required to be reasonable when adopting 
regulations aimed to enhance the hospital’s standards of medical care or public 
welfare. For instance, a private hospital cannot adopt a regulation prohibiting its 
medical staff from performing elective abortions472, because this policy is not aimed to 
further the medical standards. A hospital’s basic purpose is to make available its 
facilities for the care and treatment of the public, so the adopted policy has to rely on 
sound and sensible grounds. In this case Schreiber J held that the moral or religious 
beliefs of the hospital’s trustees are not appropriate reasons to pass such a regulation in 
a private, non-sectarian hospital473. Moreover, a hospital regulation cannot infringe a 
person’s legally recognized right, as long as the particular right is strictly related with 
the hospital’s fundamental functions. In the same case, the judges went so far as to say 
that if the law recognizes the woman’s right to elective abortion in the first trimester of 
pregnancy474, then the hospital could not refuse to perform such procedure, if the 
hospital has equipment, facilities and capacity for such abortions. 
In all other matters that are not related to the medical services, the body in 
charge with the administration of a private hospital can exercise its powers in the most 
absolute manner. For example, it can adopt no-solicitation regulations prohibiting 
distribution of leaflets and other expressions of anti-abortion views475. It was held that 
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a private hospital’s premises, unlike private sidewalks or areas fronting retail stores, 
were not historically or traditionally associated with exercise of free speech rights476. 
In Singapore there are many private hospitals477 regulated by the Private 
Hospitals and Medical Clinics Act478. Section 2 of the Act defines private hospitals as 
any premises used or intended to be used for the reception, lodging and treatment of 
persons who require medical treatment or suffer from any disease. Although the 
private hospitals are private entities they nevertheless assume public functions. They 
are open to all members of the public. Since section 2 uses the term “persons” it can be 
inferred that in respect of private hospitals general public access is recognized. It 
should be mentioned though that hospitals are “quasi-public” spaces intended for 
specific users479 and members of the public are allowed on the hospital premises only 
if their conduct is in accordance with such users.  
It is my submission that, although in Singapore there are no court decisions or 
statutory provisions discussing this matter, the principle of reasonable access as 
elaborated in earlier chapters should apply in respect of private hospitals..   
4.2.5   Extensive tracts of open land  
The next category of quasi-public property that I will refer to cannot be found 
in Singapore, due to the scarcity of land. However, notwithstanding this, it is my view 
that a detailed discussion is still called for. Across the common law jurisdictions in 
regard to extensive tracts of open land in private ownership reasonable public access is 
becoming widely recognized. In United Kingdom there is now even statutory 
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protection for public access. This underscores the changing position taken by common-
law judges in regard to the recognition and protection of the principle of reasonable 
public access to properties open for public use.  
As mentioned above, at common law the owner enjoys an absolute prerogative 
to evict from his land all persons who do not have a statutory or contractual right to be 
there. Moreover, this principle makes no distinction between various kinds of land 
(whether domestic, crowded urban spaces or open country) or between various kinds 
of landowner (whether private, corporate or governmental)480.  For this particular 
reason it is now increasingly questioned whether an unqualified exclusory privilege 
could continue to represent an inevitable incident in all kinds of land. While the strict 
enforcement of the traditional concepts of the trespass law may be entirely appropriate 
in relation to the domestic curtilage, in some other locations the claim of absolute 
exclusory power seems both meaningless and unenforceable. 
It had been suggested, particularly in Australia, that the scale of a particular 
piece of land might begin to impact upon the owner’s absolute power of eviction. In 
Hackshaw v. Shaw481 Justice Deane indicated in the High Court of Australia that 
conventional concepts of trespass may no longer be strictly applicable to isolated 
stations situated within the large expanses of Australian outback482. Much the same 
view was taken in Wik Peoples v. Queensland483 where the High Court thought it 
“unlikely” that there could have been any parliamentary intention to invest an estate 
owner with absolute exclusory power under pastoral leases covering “huge areas as 
extensive as many a county in England and bigger than some nations” in “remote and 
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generally unvisited” terrain484. In such areas, stated Justice Kirby “talk of exclusive 
possession or exclusive occupation has an unreal quality485.” 
Similarly, in Gerhardy v. Brown486a land title covering 100,000 square 
kilometers, representing more than 10 per cent of the total land area of South Australia, 
had been vested in a private non-government corporation controlled by a tribal council. 
The unconsented access to this huge tract was rendered a criminal offence, under the 
Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981, s.19 (1). The High Court of Australia 
acknowledged these provisions as a “special measure” required to protect the 
traditional cultural, social and religious interests of the tribal people concerned. 
Nevertheless several members of the High Court recognized that the rights of 
exclusion from private land may sometimes be abridged by more highly valued social 
objectives. Justice Mason was prepared to admit that, in exceptional circumstances, 
“the freedom of movement may include access to privately owned lands”487.Such 
derogation from the normal powers of a private owner was justified if, for instance” 
the purpose and effect of vesting extensive tracts of land in private ownership and 
denying a right of access to non-owners was to impede or defeat the individual’s 
freedom of movement across a State or, more relevantly, to exclude persons of a 
particular race from exercising their freedom of movement across a State”488. Also 
Justice Murphy adopted the view that the selective exclusion of strangers from land 
areas of this scale could not be said to occur within “a private zone”489. He considered 
the power to exclude from lands which are about one-tenth of the land area of South 
Australia, as an “exercise of public power”. In his reasoning Justice Deane considered 
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the human dignity and equality as the underlying policy of a general public’s 
reasonable access. He feared that the tight regulation of access rights for non-tribal 
visitors seemed “likely to create an over-isolated enclave within South Australia 
entrenched behind what amounts to a type of passport system. He was also concerned 
about how the restrictions on the access of strangers would affect the access to 
educational and health facilities. 
Additionally in the context of vast areas of land and the public’s recreational 
interest is also underlying reasons for the recognition and protection of the reasonable 
right of access to open country. I will refer in this section mainly to United Kingdom’s 
jurisdiction because there the “right to recreational access” to some private properties 
was statutorily established490. But before discussing the statutory “right to roam” the 
position prior to the enactment of the Countryside and Rights of way Act 2000 will be 
considered.  
Historically the English law has conferred on members of the public only 
extremely limited rights of recreational user in respect of land and water, although de 
facto substantial access has been enjoyed. There has never been a general right of 
access to the hills or to ramble over open uncultivated countryside491. Where 
recreational access existed, it represented, at best, a tolerated user in respect of which, 
in most of the cases, the landowner by long tradition has sought no remedy in trespass. 
This was not the case in other common law jurisdictions, especially in the United 
States, where the courts are more willing to infer the existence of an implied licence on 
the part of private landowners for public access to areas of open space492. 
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However in England and in Wales the perspective is changing. It is now 
increasingly recognized that there is a large public interest in the promotion and 
protection of general access to open countryside493. Since there is no “prescriptive right 
to roam”, acquired through long user over open country at large494 and voluntary 
arrangement for access has proved to be relatively ineffective, the optimal solution was 
the statutory reinforcement of general access rights. The recently enacted Countryside 
and Rights of Way Act 2000 is intended to “give greater freedom for people to explore 
open countryside”495. The foreword to the Department of the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions Consultation Paper (1998) states that larger access to open 
countryside “will benefit a wide range of people…They will be able to improve their 
health; to experience the wonders of wildlife and the beauty of fine landscapes; to 
learn about countryside activities, and to refresh their spirits”. This aim is achieved 
through the establishment of a public right “to enter and remain…for the purpose of 
open-air recreation” on any “access land” as defined by the Act496. The category of 
“access land”, subject to two exceptions, comprises land which is more than 600 m 
above sea level, together with other areas of “open country”497, registered common 
land498, and land which is irrevocably dedicated by the owner to purposes of public 
access499. The intention of this 2000 Act is to provide a general right to enter and 
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remain on the “access land”, consisting of 8% to 12% of the total land area of England 
and Wales500 for the purpose of open-air recreation. 
The Act attempts to reconcile the reasonable public access with the legitimate 
requirements of those who live and work in the countryside501. Therefore, in order to 
ensure the protection of privacy and of certain forms of commercial activity, some 
areas are designated as “excepted land” and remain outside the scope of access 
provisions502. One such category is land used as a park or garden503 or as private 
curtilage504. Other categories of excepted land include railways505, land covered by 
buildings, quarries506, golf courses, aerodromes507, racecourses, land occupied by 
statutory undertakers (for example, the dam or pumping station of a water company), 
and land “on which soil is being, or has at any time within the previous 12 months 
been, disturbed by any ploughing or drilling undertaken for the purpose of planting or 
sowing crops or trees”508. Since the provisions in the Act relating to excepted land 
apply to all categories of access land, if a landowner takes into cultivation an area of 
land that lies above 600 meters, the land concerned ceases to be access land. 
The new statutory right of access is limited to access on foot at all hours of day 
and night509 and is subject to extensive requirements of reasonable behaviour. For 
example, the right of access is conditional on not “breaking or damaging any wall, 
fence, hedge, stile or gate”510. Also the public is not allowed to drive a vehicle while 
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on these premises, to disturb the wildlife, to hunt or to shoot511, obstructing 
watercourses, fixing a notice or advertisement, camping, depositing rubbish or litter 
and committing any criminal offence512. If a person breaches any of the access 
restrictions, he becomes a trespasser and his entitlement to be on the land ceases for 72 
hours in relation to any land within the ownership of the aggrieved landowner513. 
The general effect of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 is to deprive 
the owners of the “access land” of the right to sue in trespass those who enter their land 
in the exercise of the public right conferred. Such owners though are still allowed to 
eject, or to obtain other civil relief against, members of the public who exceed or 
violate their statutory entitlements514. The 2000 Act does not provide any 
compensation for the affected landowners or payment of user charges by members of 
the public515, but the landowners are protected against any liability to visitors not 
already imposed by existing law516. The Act recognizes also that “a fair balance” must 
be maintained between public and private interests, and for this reason the owner, or 
other “entitled persons”517, is permitted, after giving notice to the relevant countryside 
agency, to “exclude or restrict” public access on a maximum of 28 days per calendar 
year518. Other exclusions or restrictions may be allowed by the relevant countryside 
agency for special purposes of land management519, for the avoidance of fire or other 
danger to the public520, for the protection of ecologically sensitive or archaeologically  
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significant sites521 and in cases of emergency522.                          
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CHAPTER 5- CONCLUSION  
As it can be inferred from the cases and statutes discussed above, in the 
common law world there is growing support today for the view that arbitrary and 
capricious powers of exclusion can no longer be an inevitable incident of property in 
all kinds of land. In numerous common law jurisdictions there is a noticeable move 
away from the “arbitrary exclusion rule” towards a “reasonable access rule”. Where 
land is open for public use it is becoming widely recognized that as long as members 
of the public conduct themselves reasonably, and abide by the general law and the 
specific regulations, they are entitled to enter and to remain on the land open for 
general public use. The landowner should no longer be allowed to evict them in an 
arbitrary manner, without giving a good reason. 
It should be noted that the “reasonable access rule” does not apply to land used 
solely for private purposes, regardless of whether the land is under State or private 
ownership, because in these situations concerns of ownership rights outweigh any 
competing claims of access. Added to this, in respect for the “sanctity of a man’s home 
and the privacies of life”523, the courts do not allow the “reasonable access rule” to 
reach into the family home and its immediate surroundings524. The reasonable access 
principle is limited in application to land “affected with public interest”525, i.e. private 
or State land to which members of the public enjoy a general unrestricted invitation. 
As Justice Marshall said in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board526, where land 
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has an essential public character, “a degree of privacy is necessarily surrendered”527 
and the owner of such land must accommodate his rights with the interests of the 
public. 
However, the owner of a land open for public use does not lose his proprietary 
power of exclusion. He still has the power to make regulations controlling the access 
to its property and the permitted conduct thereon. He may impose “reasonable time, 
place and manner restrictions” on the conduct of those who enjoy access to his 
premises528 but he is required to be objective when applying them to specific 
individuals and he should be careful not to infringe protected human rights. The 
owner’s exclusory rights are therefore limited by a requirement of reasonableness. 
In some common law countries it is becoming increasingly argued that 
considerations of proportionality have to be taken into account when evicting an 
individual from a land dedicated for public use. In Canada, for example, it has been 
suggested that a clear proportionality has to be maintained between the scope of an 
exclusion from the premises and the legitimate interest and purposes of the excluder529. 
The same view is taken in United States by the Supreme Court in New Jersey in State 
v. Morse530. The court overruled a ban imposed until further written notice on a casino 
patron suspected of cheating, stating that as long as the patron acts disorderly, “a 
casino can lawfully exclude the patron for that day”531. However, in the court’s view 
“fairness mandates that when the patron attempts to return to the casino and acts in 
accordance with all lawful condition imposed, the patron cannot be excluded, as he is 
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not interfering with any legitimate business interest”532. Similarly, in Kreimer v. 
Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown533 the Court of Appeal of the United 
States pointed out that the regulations concerning the permitted conduct on the 
premises made by a public library were not sufficiently “narrow tailored” to withstand 
constitutional challenge. The court’s reason was that the regulations “bar permanently 
a patron from re-entry to the library once the patron complies with the requirements in 
the absence of pervasive abuse”534. 
Another condition imposed on the landowner by the American courts is to 
comply with the requirements of due process. Accordingly, the withdrawal of an 
existing freedom must not be random or arbitrary, but instead it should provide the 
opportunity to challenge the relevant deprivation. For example, the exclusion of a 
reader from a public library may be invalidated by a failure to afford the reader “pre-
deprivation process”535 or at least formal or informal procedure by which he can 
challenge his denial of access536  
 5.1  Nature of the public right of reasonable access  
As discussed above in earlier chapters, this principle of reasonableness is 
beginning to be applied to all types of land intended for and dedicated to public use, 
whether subject to private or State ownership. As long as the owner opens his land for 
public use, it is assumed that he extends an invitation to all members of the public to 
use it.  As such, members of the public are regarded as licensees subject to certain 
implied conditions. 
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In relation to shopping malls, for example, the invitation to the public is broad, 
encompassing “not just an invitation to shop, but to do whatever one would do 
downtown, including doing very little of anything”537. In respect to other properties 
dedicated to public use, like private hospitals, universities or public libraries, the 
implied invitation is limited by the specific nature of the place and the functions 
performed there. 
As a general rule, the landowner can decide, no matter how capriciously or 
arbitrarily, who may enter or remain on his land. In the traditional view bare licences 
are terminable without any requirement of objectively reasonable cause538 and without 
any obligation to offer a rationally communicable explanation, either before or after, 
for any particular act of exclusion539. The licensor simply enjoys an unchallengeable 
discretion to withhold or withdraw permission to enter540.  
Nowadays it is increasingly held by many common law courts that the licence 
allowing public access to various kinds of land open for public use should not be 
terminated at the exclusive will of the owner, either on wholly irrational grounds or 
without showing a good cause541.  
The emergence of the view supporting the right not to be arbitrarily evicted 
from land is not a totally new idea in the common law. For instance, in a contractual 
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licence the licensee is accorded the right not to be evicted in a capricious manner, but 
only in accordance with the contractual terms542.  
A contractual licence is a contract permitting a person to be present on 
someone else’s land. This permission derives its force from an express or implied 
contract543. It differs from the bare licence in that it is not granted gratuitously but is 
founded upon valuable consideration moving from the licesee544. For example, the 
contractual licence underlies the right of a cinema fan to sit in the auditorium or that of 
the football spectator to enter a stadium545. Also, the building contractor who works on 
a construction site enjoys a contractual licence to be present on that site for the 
duration of the works involved546. 
The law relating to the revocation and termination of contractual licences has 
undergone an important transformation during the past half-century. In the middle of 
19th century it was settled law that a contractual licence could be effectively revoked 
by the licensor at any time, notwithstanding that the revocation constituted a clear 
breach of contract. The decision in Wood v. Leadbitter547 demonstrated the 
landowner’s paramount right to exclude. The claimant had purchased a ticket of 
admission to the grandstand and enclosure during the four days of the Doncaster races. 
The owner of the racecourse knew that the claimant had been involved in alleged 
betting malpractices at another racecourse and therefore he evicted him from the 
enclosure. In the court’s view the landowner had an unchallengeable discretion to 
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withhold or withdraw permission to enter, and therefore it rejected the plaintiff’s claim 
for damages for assault and false imprisonment. 
More recent decisions548 however recognize the fact that a contractual licence 
is no longer effectively revocable at the licensor’s whim. Today the contractual licence 
is widely viewed as “irrevocable except as contemplated by the terms of the 
contract”549. 
The first step taken by the courts was to adopt the “implied contract” theory. It 
came to be accepted that, in a contractual licence, the element of licence is not a 
separate entity but it is one of the manifestations of the contract in which it is 
contained550. According to this theory, where a contract includes a permission to 
occupy land for a specific purpose or period of time, a negative obligation can be 
implied on the part of the licensor, an obligation not to revoke the licence wrongfully 
before the completion of that purpose or period551. 
The implication of a negative term in restraint of premature or improper 
revocation of contractual licence opened the way for the courts to exercise an equitable 
jurisdiction to restrain the licensor from wrongful eviction of the licensee before the 
due termination of the contract. As the Court of Appeal explained in Winter Garden 
Theatre (London) Ltd v. Millenium Productions Ltd552 the courts will not assist the 
licensor to act in breach of his contractual undertaking. 
The public’s licence to enter land open for public use may be compared with a 
contractual licence, and should not be revocable by the landowner as long as members 
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of the public comply with all his express or implied conditions553. The landowner 
should not revoke the public’s licence arbitrarily but only for good cause. It is also 
argued that under the principle of reasonable access the conditions imposed by the 
landowner may be questioned if they are unreasonable. Members of the public should 
nevertheless take into account the intended user of the land. A specific condition can 
be reasonable in one instance and unreasonable in the other. For example, a prohibition 
to distribute leaflets was held to be reasonable in the context of private hospitals554 but 
unreasonable in respect of State-owned airports555.  
 5.2  Various reasons supporting the public reasonable access  
There are different justifications for the emergence of the principle of 
“reasonableness’, depending on the nature and the major use to which the land is put. 
Firstly, it has been put forward in different court decisions and articles in some  
common law jurisdictions that the unqualified assertion of exclusion powers may at 
times infringe the public’s fundamental principles of human freedom and dignity.  
It has been said that property rights and personal rights coalesce in some 
degree556 and that the scope on an owner’s property is intrinsically curtailed by 
limitations of a broadly moral character557. For instance, Justice Murphy of the High 
Court of Australia expressed the view that the limits of property “are the interfaces 
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between accepted and unaccepted social claims”558. In accordance with the Kantian or 
dignitarian view559, it is suggested today that the “rights to interchange” are intrinsic to 
a proper recognition of a person’s humanity. 
It is nowadays increasingly argued that the recognition of absolute rights of 
exclusion from property open for public use threaten the normal exercise of the public 
rights to assembly, association and movement. In Bell v. Maryland, Justice Goldberg 
considered the right to move freely to be “now more than ever inextricably linked with 
the right of the citizen to be accepted and to be treated equally in places of public 
accommodation”560.  
Closely connected to the above-mentioned rights is the right of expression561, 
which includes not only verbal activities but also many of symbolic or non-verbal 
communications562. Freedom of expression covers also “nondisruptive speech” such as 
wearing a T-shirt or button which contain a political message563. Freedom of 
expression can extend to the display or celebration of a particular lifestyle or cultural, 
religious or political affiliation. According to Tobriner J of the Supreme Court of 
California, this freedom would be infringed if, for instance, a shopping centre would 
be allowed to “exclude individuals who wear long hair or unconventional dress, who 
are black…who belong to the American Civil Liberties Union, merely because of these 
characteristics or association”564. 
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The courts in United States and Canada have frequently argued that “the naked 
mere title” of property owners should not be permitted to obstruct the exercise of civil 
rights by members of the public565. As Justice Roberts said “a person is not to have the 
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriated places abridged on the plea that it 
may be exercised in some other place”566 
Secondly, it has been argued that, in certain circumstances, unqualified 
applications of the “arbitrary exclusion rule” endorse a socially unaccepted 
concentration of power in the landowner567. It is increasingly acknowledged that 
“accumulations of economic power by non-governmental entities can, by use of that 
power, pose as great a threat to individual liberty as can government”568. As Justice 
Murphy pointed out in the High Court of Australia “the distinction between public 
power and private power is not clear-cut and one may shade into the other”569. For that 
reason a careful scrutiny is required in order to prevent these owner from abusing their 
rights by exercising them in an unreasonable and oppressive manner. 
For instance, Chief Justice Laskin in his dissenting reasoning in Harrison v. 
Carswell indicated that property powers which excessively curtail or destroy the basic 
liberties of the citizen are best qualified in terms of abuse of right570. Similarly, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada remarked that the consequence of 
leaving such powers unchecked is the emergence of unacceptable inequalities in the 
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enjoyment of civil rights571. It would mean that “only those with enough wealth to own 
land, or mass media facilities…would be able to engage in free expression”572. There is 
a wide debate in common law countries, especially in the United States and United 
Kingdom, whether homeless or unemployed people can be peremptorily evicted from 
places open for public use. The debate refers not only to their eviction from State land, 
such as public libraries573, public parks574, railway stations 575or city sidewalks576, but 
also from private shopping centres577.  The predominant opinion is that arbitrary 
exclusion from such properties would lead to large areas of city being effectively 
converted into no-go areas for certain classes of individuals578.  The view has been 
expressed that in our modern urban context this arbitrary exclusion is both morally 
offensive and socially dangerous579. 
Thirdly, it has been suggested that that the size of land open for public use may 
impact upon the owner’s exclusory powers. It is becoming increasingly accepted that 
where the land is vast and expansive the public enjoys a right of access. In Australia, 
for example, it has been indicated in the High Court that the conventional law of 
trespass may no longer be strictly applicable to isolated stations situated within the 
large expanses of the Australian outback580. Similarly, in Gerhardy v. Brown581several 
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members of the High Court were willing to recognize that rights of exclusion from 
extensive lands may sometimes be limited by more highly valued social objectives.  
The American courts also expressed the view that absolute exclusory powers 
are not appropriate in respect of extensive holdings of land. For example, in Marsh v. 
Alabama582 the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of press or religion could not be 
denied to residents of a municipality in Chickasaw, Alabama simply because a private 
company, Gulf Shipping Corp, held legal title to the entire town583. Furthermore, in 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza584 Justice 
Marchall led the Supreme Court in extending March v. Alabama to justify access for 
expressional freedom within the precincts of a large shopping plaza585. 
Lastly, mainly in the context of shopping malls, courts seem to be emphasizing 
that the liberality of the owner’s invitation to the public is intrinsically aimed at 
furthering his own interests, essentially economic, rather than those of the 
community586. For this reason the owner is effectively estopped from making arbitrary 
or selective derogations from the inclusiveness of his invitation587. The same opinion 
was expressed two hundred years ago by Blackstone. In his view, the man who “hangs 
out a sign” and “opens” his premises to all comers enters into “an implied 
engagement” not to abuse the implicit rights of those who enter588.    
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5.3  Overview of the position taken in different common law jurisdictions  
From the analysis of court decisions and statutes of the different common law 
jurisdictions made above, we can conclude that while some jurisdictions adopt and 
apply the principle of reasonable access, others still remain faithful to the conservative 
traditional position. 
In United States, for example, there are many court decision recognizing the 
public reasonable access to different kinds of land open for public use, whether private 
or State property. Usually judges based their judgments on State constitutions, arguing 
that the landowner’s unlimited powers of eviction when exercised in an unreasonable 
manner infringe the constitutionally protected human rights of free speech and 
assembly. For exemple, in Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown589 the 
Court of Appeal of the United States expressed the view that, in respect of land 
dedicated to public use and benefit, arbitrary powers of exclusion are not appropriate. 
Judge Sarokin stated ” enforcement [of library policy] cannot be left to the whim or 
personal vagaries of the persons in charge…We cannot-we dare not- cross the 
threshold of barring persons from entering because of how they appear based upon the 
unfettered discretion of another”590. 
On the other hand, there are some states where the courts seem to have taken a 
different position. Absolute rights of evictions are sometimes supported “by reference 
to arguments of social policy and commercial utility”591. For instance, there is a view 
that only the recognition of the absolute powers of exclusion can relieve the landowner 
from the necessity of showing sound justification every time they evict someone from 
                                                
589
 [1991] 765 F Supp 181. 
590
 See Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown [1991] 765 F Supp 181 at 183, per 
Sarokin, District J. 
591
 See Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, ‘Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Spaces’, 
(1999), European Human Rights Law Review, 46 at 60. 
 115
their land 592 and also from the burden of ad hoc decision-making under pressured 
conditions593 and from the constant possibility of being sued by way of review594. 
Justice Garibaldi argued in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. 
JMB Realty Corporation595 that only a broadly framed and unchallengeable power of 
exclusion can enable the owner of quasi-public land decisively to deny a forum for the 
expression of offensive and anti-social viewpoints or lifestyle596. 
It is also frequently argued that the untrammeled right to evict visitors on the 
sole ground that they ”look like trouble”597 is an important element in controlling and 
ordering places of public resort. The subjectively perceived thread of crime or other 
disturbance is considered to override any need for rational justification of peremptory 
eviction598. Accordingly, in Brooks v. Chicago Downs Association, Inc the view was 
expressed that “the proprietor wants to be able to keep someone off his private 
property even if they only look like a mobster”599. 
In Australia reasonable public access was recognized in respect of large tracts 
of open land and private racecourses. In Gerhardy v. Brown600, for example, the court 
recognized the public right of access to a vast private land controlled by Pitjantjatjara 
tribal council. The reason supporting the court’s decision was the large size of the land, 
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more than 10 per cent of the total land area of South Australia. In the court’s opinion, 
the owner of such extensive tracts of land cannot be allowed to deny the right of access 
to all members of the public because this would impede the individual freedom of 
movement across the State601. As argued in Wik Peoples v. Queensland602, in respect of 
huge areas “as extensive as many a county in England and bigger than some nations” 
talk of exclusive possession or occupation has “an unreal quality”603. In Gerhardy v. 
Brown Justice Murphy did not consider these extensive tracts of open land as “private 
zone” and regarded the power to exclude from such land as “an exercise of public 
power” that had to be carried out in a reasonable manner604. 
In respect of private racecourses, the Australian courts held that the public 
enjoys a reasonable right of access to these private properties because the racing clubs 
have statutory powers and as such, they cannot exercise their exclusory rights in an 
arbitrary manner605. The benefit that the owner of such places derives from public 
attendance was also pointed out. Justice Gibbs ruled in that the owner of a racecourse 
“owes a moral duty to the public to whose attendance he benefits…by [not] excluding 
him quite arbitrarily and capriciously”606. 
Unlike the courts in United States and Australia, the courts in Canada are 
generally  more conservative and not willing to depart from the traditional view that 
confers on the private landowner absolute power to decide who enter and who stays on 
his property. Many judges consider that the recognition of a reasonable public right of 
access to all types of land intended for public use is an important change in the law. 
Dickson J in the Supreme Court of Canada admitted that he is not against the 
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recognition of this new right but argued that legislating in this matter is not in a court’s 
power607. In his opinion, judges should simply follow the existing law and leave the 
radical changes to be done by the Legislature608. On the other hand, Chief Justice 
Laskin in his strong dissent in Harrison v. Carswell609 was ready to change the law and 
to recognize the right of reasonable access to private shopping malls for all members 
of the public. He argued that the common law could not remain “so devoid of reason” 
as to tolerate the “whimsy” of entirely arbitrary exclusion from such “quasi-public” 
locations open and intended for public use610. 
However, the Supreme Court of Canada did rule in The Queen in Right of 
Canada v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada611 that reasonable public 
access cannot be arbitrarily denied in the case of State owned airports. The Court 
regarded State property as “quasi-fiduciary”, held in trust for the benefit and use of all 
people612. Even in this case the Supreme Court did not expressly recognize the 
existence of a general public right of access to State property open for public use, but 
rested its decision on the constitutional protection of civil rights of access, movement 
and communication 
In United Kingdom the courts recognize the existence of a “reasonable access 
rule” in relation to certain categories of land dedicated to public use. For example, the 
imposition of a standard of reasonableness is established in relation to private owners 
whose rights of control derive from statutory authority. Thus, in Cinnamond v. British 
Airports Authority613 Lord Denning MR declared, in relation to a statutorily 
established airport authority, that “if bona fide airline passenger comes to the airport, 
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they cannot turn him back- at their discretion without rhyme or reason- as a private 
landowner can”, unless “ the circumstances are such as fairly and reasonably to 
warrant it”614. 
On the other hand, the judges seem reluctant to limit the exclusory powers of 
other categories of private landowners who open their property for public use but who 
are not statutorily established or controlled. The decision in CIN Properties Ltd v. 
Rawlins615 is a good example of the conservative position adopted by the English 
courts.  Lord Justice Balcombe of the Court of Appeal rejected the existence of any 
“equitable” or “irrevocable” right of public entry to pedestrian mall within an inner 
town shopping centre. He refused to accept that a landowner’s power to exclude is 
exercisable only upon the showing of good cause and declined to create an 
“appropriate legal framework” to accord with social changes616. As such, the Court of 
Appeal endorsed CIN Properties’ peremptory eviction of persons against whom no 
charge of misconduct has been made out. 
The only exception to this conservative approach is the statutory establishment 
of a public right “to enter and remain… for the purpose of open-air recreation”617 on 
large tracts of private open land. The recently enacted Countryside and Rights of Way 
Act 2000 is intended to “give greater freedom for people to explore open countryside” 
subject only to requirements of reasonable behaviour618. 
It can be inferred from the cases discussed above that generally the courts in 
United States and Australia seem more open towards the recognition and protection of 
a right of public reasonable access to land open for public use, whether private or State 
ownership. On the other hand, in Canada and United Kingdom judges are ready to 
                                                
614
 Ibid at 588 A-E, per Lord Denning, MR. 
615
 [1995] 2 EGLR 130. 
616
 See CIN Properties Ltd v. Rawlins [1995] 2 EGLR 130 at 134H-J, per Balcombe, LJ. 
617
 See Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, s 2 (1). 
618
 See the extensive discussion above in Chapter 4, p. 99-102. 
 119
recognize only a right of reasonable public access to State property. In respect of 
private land, judges seem reluctant to leave the traditional approach that confers on the 
landowners absolute powers of exclusion. In United Kingdom the only exception was 
made in respect of wide tracts of private open land. The right of reasonable public 
access to this type of land open for public use is since 2000 statutorily established by 
the enactment of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act.  
5.4  The approach taken in Singapore    
5.4.1  State owned property- land open for public use    
As discussed earlier in chapter 2, Singapore legislation does not seem to 
differentiate between a private owner and the State in respect of their powers of 
eviction. The State Land Encroachment Act619 exemplifies different instances of 
trespassing to State land, but it does not limit the State’s right to proceed against 
trespassers620. Section 19 states that “nothing in this Act shall be held to deprive the 
Government of any right to proceed under the law, or of any remedy against 
trespassers given by the law”. 
The Singapore courts have not as far as I am aware pronounced on the 
application of the principle of “reasonable access”. There is also no statutory provision 
imposing on the State a general requirement of reasonable access in respect of its 
property. Nevertheless, its existence can be inferred from the different rules made by 
the State regulating the public’s permitted conduct on its land. 
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For instance, free access to State land open for public use and enjoyment is 
granted to all members of the public621, subject to certain restrictions. All individuals 
are required to conduct themselves in accordance with the general law and the specific 
regulations, not to obstruct the proper functioning of the place622 or to disturb other 
users623. Contravention or failure to comply with the regulations are considered 
offences and are punishable by fine624. On the other hand, also the State is not allowed 
to act in an arbitrary manner. Accordingly, police officers or employee of the 
Authorities managing different State properties have the power to evict only those 
members of the public who have a disturbing conduct, who contravene or are about to 
contravene the general law or the specific regulations625.  
A survey of the legislation and regulations applicable to State owned land 
shows that the provisions are designed to ensure that the land is open to reasonable use 
by members of the public. However there is the latent problem of whether the State is 
obliged to act reasonably626  
5.4.2  Land owned by statutory corporations intended for public use   
Statutory corporations, such as the Housing and Development Board, the Civil 
Aviation Authority or the Land Transport Authority, although created and regulated by 
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statute627 and performing public functions, are individual legal entities. The land that 
they own is regarded as land in private ownership. As owners they have the right to 
regulate the access to their property and also the public’s conduct while on their 
premises628. Public access to their land open for public use is regulated both by 
statutory provisions and the rules made by the corporations themselves. 
It is suggested that the principle of “reasonable public access” to land owned by 
the statutory corporations and intended for public use can be inferred from the 
legislation.  
Firstly, it is relevant to note that all members of the public are allowed to 
access this special type of property. Both the statutes and the specific regulations use 
terms such as “any person”629 or “no person”630 in relation to the use of the property. 
Secondly, general public access is permitted only subject to reasonable behaviour. The 
specific regulations set out in detail the prohibited activities on the premises, 
depending on the intended purpose or nature of the property. As long as their conduct 
is according to the prescribed guidelines, all members of the public should be admitted 
to the statutory corporations’ land open for public use. Thirdly, the legislation requires 
the authorized employees of the Corporations to act reasonably when exercising their 
powers of eviction. They are allowed to exclude from the premises only those 
individuals who fail to obey the imposed restrictions631.  
In regard to both State land and land owned by statutory corporations the 
question is what position a Singapore court would take if a case challenging the 
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reasonableness of the rule were to be brought before it. For example, the National 
Library Rules prohibits the entrance to library premises to all members of the public 
whose bodily odor might create discomfort to other users632. Suppose that a library 
user enters it after ingesting a large quantity of onions and garlic and the library 
officer, relying on the above- mentioned regulation, denies him the entry. The question 
is whether a member of the public can successfully challenge such regulation made by 
a statutory corporation on grounds of unreasonableness. It is interesting to note that in 
United States a library provision with almost the same content, requiring all “patrons 
whose bodily hygiene is so offensive as to constitute a nuisance to other persons” to 
leave the building, was declared unreasonably vague by the District Court of New 
Jersey in Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown633.  
I should like to suggest that the Singapore courts should follow the view 
expressed in certain jurisdictions that the owner’s proprietary right in such resources 
are curtailed by limitations of “moral character”634. This opinion has already been 
expressed in the Singapore Court of Appeal in Xpress Print Pte Ltd v. Monocrafs Pte 
Ltd & Anor635.  Yong Pung How, CJ, referring to landowner’s right of support, 
recognized that ownership in land is as much a social obligation as it is a private right. 
The Court of Appeal based its decision on the Latin maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienaum 
non laedes”, use your property in such a way as not to injure the rights of others. This 
approach can be extrapolated and applied in the context of obligation of an owner of 
land open for public use to his invitee.   
The Singapore courts should adopt the more radical view that requires the State 
and the statutory corporations as landowners to decide in a reasonable manner when 
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 See the National Library Rules, Cap 197, R. 2, 1990 Rev. Ed,  s. 22(2). 
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 [1991] 765 F Supp 181 at 195, per Sarokin J. 
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 See Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, (1991) CLJ 252 at 287. 
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evicting from or denying access to their property. The view expressed by Laskin CJC 
in Harrison v. Carswell636 is more in keeping with the modern urban life than that 
expressed by the Court of Appeal in CIN Properties v. Rawlins637.  
It is my opinion that, in respect of land open for public use that is owned by the 
State or statutory corporations, there is a need for explicit statutory recognition of the 
right of “reasonable public access”. As discussed above, currently although not 
expressly stated, this right can be easily inferred from the relevant statutory provisions.  
But it is submitted that a right clearly established by statute would offer a better 
protection for the public. Although it is true that when deciding a case a judge 
expresses an opinion which is influenced by all the facts brought before him, 
nevertheless if the principle of reasonable public access is established by statute, the 
judge is obliged to take it into consideration and apply it according to the case.  
5.4.3  Private land intended for public use   
As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, as far as I am aware in Singapore there are 
no statutes or court decision regulating this matter. Should a case appear, the law from 
other common law jurisdictions can provide some guidance for the Singaporean courts. 
It should be noted that there is not a unanimous opinion across the common law 
jurisdictions, but it would seem that the principle of “reasonable public access” is 
gaining growing support. There are judges who express a more radical view that a 
private owner is required to show the same degree of reasonableness as the State, 
because what really counts is the use to which the land is put and not the form of 
ownership. However, others favor the traditional view preserving the landowner’s 
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absolute powers of eviction. There are also judges who, while they admit that the 
owner’s exclusory powers should be curtailed by a requirement of reasonableness, do 
not accept that this is to the same extent as in the case of State property.  
Since there are no statutory provisions regulating public access to private land 
open for public use, the question is what view would the Singapore courts follow if a 
case were to be brought in front of them. It is my view that there should be no 
distinction between land owned by the State or by statutory corporations and land 
owned by the private individuals. What should determine the exclusory rights of the 
owner is the extent and nature of public use of the land. The principle of reasonable 
access should apply whenever land, regardless of ownership, is open for public use.   
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